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THE ANATOMY OF AN IMAGE: UNPACKING THE
CASE FOR TORT REFORM
Joshua D. Kelner*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the tort system has been the subject of intense and
sustained criticism in the public sphere.1 Proponents of what is commonly
referred to as “tort reform”2 have addressed themselves quite consciously to
the general public, advancing their commentary, for the most part, not in law
reviews or other academic journals, but by way of books, op-ed pieces, and
the broadcast media. Indeed, their critique of the tort system—not to
mention their normative conceptualization of its proper role in American
society—diverges considerably from proposals for reform advanced from
within the academy. Its familiar refrains include such terms as litigation
explosion, personal responsibility, and common sense, and conjure the
image of a society overrun by the costs of frivolous lawsuits. Oftentimes,
the tone is not dispassionate, but polemical, and the argument for change is
predicated more on rhetoric and symbolism than empirical facts.3
To be sure, popular dialogue regarding the appropriate functions of
the tort system is by no means a new development. William L. Prosser’s

_______________________________________________________
* Associate, Kelner & Kelner, Esqs. J.D., Harvard Law School (2004); B.A., Williams College (2001).
1
For observations as to the increasing prevalence of such a popular, as opposed to academic, critique, see
generally Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 Ga. L. Rev.
633, 644-81 (1994); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Md. L. Rev. 3, 3-6 (1986);
Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (And Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4, 6 (1983); Michael L.
Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a
Battleground of Social Theory, 68 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 1-5 (2002).
2
To a certain extent, the term tort reform is something of a misnomer. In common parlance, it has come
to be associated with proposals for “pro-defendant legislative adjustments to common law rules.” Joseph
A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 Geo. L.J. 649, 650 (1990) (reviewing Liability: The Legal
Revolution and its Consequences by Peter W. Huber). Nevertheless, it is used herein for the sake of
descriptive, if not normative, clarity.
3
As the reviewer of an early incarnation of the popular tort critique, Peter W. Huber’s Liability, noted,
[It] makes no pretense at being scholarly. Indeed, the many inaccuracies and
distortions sprinkled throughout the book lend it a certain perverse charm. The
book targets the lay reader and sets out to savage the current tort system in no
uncertain terms. With a voice that ranges from brisk to acerbic to mean-spirited,
Huber is of a mind to take no prisoners as he heaps scorn upon the “naïve”
academics and judges whom he accuses of creating the intellectual framework of
contemporary tort law, and upon the trial lawyers who have translated theory into
practice.
Page, supra n. 2, at 659.
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classic treatise observes that “perhaps more than any other branch of the law,
the law of torts is a battleground for social theory.” 4 Certainly, the tort
system, by its very existence, requires society to address difficult questions
regarding the role it sees fit for the courts to perform in mediating disputes
and enforcing social values. Moreover, in its operation, the system requires
the continued interrogation and application of established norms, and this
task inevitably draws public scrutiny and can provoke widespread
controversy. For these reasons, among many others, it is hardly uncommon
for issues concerning the tort system to enter popular consciousness or
political discourse.
However, the present debate regarding tort reform is especially
noteworthy, this historical background notwithstanding, for at least two
reasons. First, to a significant extent, the development of the dialogue and
its dynamics has been influenced, if not altogether shaped, by a deliberate
and coordinated campaign. This suggestion has been advanced elsewhere
with varying degrees of literalism. Professors Michael L. Rustad and
Thomas H. Koenig argue that the present tort reform campaign is a
“conscious goal-oriented practical activity, designed to produce a dominant
discourse that will predispose legislators, judges, legal academics, and the
general public to support liability-limiting tort doctrines.”5 Put somewhat
more mildly, it can at the least be said that “the new tort reform is a political
attack on tort law in the legislative arena.”6 To the extent that this is the
case, it fundamentally differs from previous waves of tort reform
movements, which were more directly influenced by legal scholarship.7 A
natural consequence of the fact that the movement for reform is thus rooted
is that its advocates rely as much on dramatic and emotionally captivating
claims as empirical evidence.8 This is not a pejorative claim on my part.
Rather, it is to suggest that, as the movement for tort reform originates in the
political context, the manner in which its advocates have pursued their
agenda can be expected to reflect as much. For instance, their claims are
often rooted in anecdotal evidence and capitalize upon popular perceptions
about the system in advocating reform.
There are several institutions that have been particularly influential
in promoting the popular movement for tort reform. Perhaps most notable

_______________________________________________________
4

William L. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts § 3, 14 (3d ed., West 1964).
Rustad & Koenig, supra n. 1, at 5.
Page, supra n. 2, at 655.
7
Id. at 653-54.
8
See e.g. Richard L. Abel, Judges Write the Darndest Things: Judicial Mystification of Limitations on
Tort Liability, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1547, 1548 (2002). Professor Abel notes: “Insurers and well-organized
repeat-player defendants have waged a costly and deceptive campaign over several decades - with media
complicity - to disseminate the myths that Americans file large numbers of frivolous cases and juries are
excessively generous to victims.” Id.
5
6
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among them is the Manhattan Institute, a conservative think tank.9 It has
funded popular authors such as Peter W. Huber and Walter K. Olson,
disseminated numerous policy papers, and engaged in lobbying efforts in
support of the causes and polices it favors. Kenneth J. Chesebro contends
that:
[T]he Manhattan Institute's objective is to change the minds
of the public and mold that consensus by providing this
"steady stream" of ideas to the media. To that end, the longtested techniques developed by Madison Avenue, including
the market-testing [sic] of ideas, are used by the Manhattan
Institute to sell ideas [and] shape public perceptions . . .10
Other organizations, such as Common Good—founded by Philip K. Howard,
another popular critic of the tort system—and the American Association for
Tort Reform have also contributed to the campaign, as have industrial actors
seeking to reduce the extent to which they are threatened by tort liability.11
Second, this campaign has been successful not only in dictating the
dynamics of public discourse, but in influencing the dynamics of legislative
policy regarding the courts. In the political arena, proposals for tort reform
have received significant support from legislators on both the state and
national levels. One of the components of the Republican Contract With
America, which commanded significant support in Congress, was the set of
proposals for federal tort reform collectively referred to as the Common
Sense bill. 12 Significantly, the policy prescriptions advanced in that
proposal did not, for the most part, embody the insights or suggestions of
recent legal scholarship.13 Instead, as the preface to the bill included in the
published platform suggested, the proposals were motivated by the
impression that “America has become a litigious society” and by concern
regarding the purportedly increasing prevalence of frivolous lawsuits. 14
More recently, the House of Representatives passed a bill which would have
imposed a $250,000 cap on non-pecuniary damages in actions arising from
instances of medical malpractice.15 At the time the legislation was initially
unveiled, President Bush commented: “We have a problem in America.

_______________________________________________________
9
Manhattan Institute For Policy Research, Home Page, http://www.manhattan-institute.org (accessed Jan.
16, 2006).
10
Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1637,
1710-1711 (1993).
11
Common Good, Home Page, http://cgood.org (accessed Jan. 16, 2006).
12
Republican Contract With America, “The Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Description Background
¶ 1” http://house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (accessed Dec. 28, 2005).
13
“Common Sense” Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1782
(1996).
14
Republican Contract With America, supra n. 12.
15
See current Sen. 11, 108th Cong. (June 26, 2003).
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There are too many frivolous lawsuits against good doctors, and the patients
are paying the price.”16
The political movement for tort reform has been still more
successful on the state level. Since 1980, thirty-two states have passed
limits on the recovery of punitive damages, thirty-five states have imposed
joint and several liability limitations, and eleven have limited potential
recoveries for pain and suffering. 17 These developments, as Professors
Koenig and Rustad have observed, suggest that “proponents of tort
retrenchment are winning by controlling the language and imagery of the
political struggle,” perhaps so much so as to justify the notion that the
system is “under siege.” 18 Tellingly, however, the supposed litigation
explosion—to offer one example—has been persuasively debunked. As one
scholar noted, “The outcome thus far of the political debate over the
litigation explosion presents a sobering example of how ideological currents
and political organization can overwhelm sociolegal scholarship.”19
The increasing prevalence, stridency, and influence of the popular
case for tort reform have not gone unnoticed within the legal academy.
Primarily, commentators have responded to its development by advancing
two sorts of analyses. First, a litany of scholars has adeptly refuted the
arguments propounded by the proponents of tort reform.20 Most typically,
they have called attention to the logical and empirical fallacies that have
tended to characterize these polemical works. In so doing, they have
demonstrated that many of the analyses put forth by tort reform advocates
lack serious scholarly merit; at times, they have even exposed tort reform
advocates as disingenuous. Second, though with less frequency, scholars
have devoted attention to understanding how the critique of the legal system
functions, on both logical and symbolic levels.21 Most typically, though,
these studies have been conducted as threshold components of empirical
refutations. Perhaps for this reason, those articles that have sought to
explain the manner in which the case for tort reform has been framed have
tended to cluster the arguments advanced by its proponents into a handful of
distinct and generally insular categories (e.g, frivolous lawsuits, greedy
plaintiffs, deceitful lawyers, etc.). For instance, in his article, The Day After
the Litigation Explosion, Professor Marc Galanter notes that the empirical

_______________________________________________________
16
President George W. Bush, Speech, President Announces Framework to Modernize and Improve
Medicare (D.C., Mar. 4, 2003) , at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030304-5.html
(accessed Dec. 28, 2005).
17
Rustad & Koenig, supra n. 1, at 67.
18
Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, In Defense of Tort Law, 3 (NYU Press 2001).
19
Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Scholarship, and Sociolegal Change: Lessons From Galanter and the
“Litigation Crisis,” 21 L. & Socy. Rev. 677, 689 (1988).
20
See e.g. Chesebro, supra n. 10; Galanter, Litigation Explosion, supra n. 1, at 3.
21
See e.g. Bruce A. Finzen & Brooke B. Tassoni, Regulation of Consumer Products: Myth, Reality, and
the Media, 11 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Policy 523 (2002); Rustad & Koenig, supra n. 1.
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claim regarding the increased frequency of frivolous lawsuits underlies
many of these proposals for reform and then proceeds exhaustively to refute
it.22
While attempts to discredit the most prevalent arguments for tort
reform have been thoughtful and persuasive, those that have sought to
understand the manner in which the critique has been framed have not been
as successful. While they have isolated a somewhat circumscribed set of
arguments as component parts of the case for tort reform, they have failed to
perform the next, and perhaps most important, analytical step: understanding
the relationship of these arguments to one another. What scholars have
failed to appreciate is that the variant arguments advanced by proponents of
tort reform cohere—and complement one another—as an overarching
critique of the court system itself. This is not merely to suggest that, by
adopting an appropriate level of generality, one can characterize the variant
strands of argumentation as originating in a common impulse or classifiable
in a common rubric. Rather, it is to contend that they are intertwined with
one another: they are not diverse arguments advanced in support of a
common proposition, but components of a logical network which, in their
origins and implications, are mutually reinforcing.
An additional, albeit closely related, point is that the case for tort
reform is based not only upon criticism of the legal system as it presently
exists, but on a common normative conception of societal values. There are
not just arguments about the legal system, lawyers, or plaintiffs’
questionable morality; there are also mirror image arguments about what
individuals and societal institutions presently are or ideally should be. For
example, the idea that frivolous lawsuits result from the failure of a plaintiff
to take “personal responsibility” for his actions rests, in significant part,
upon the idea that we, as putative members of the rest of society, should and
would assume such personal responsibility if we were placed in the same
situation. To an extent, this is a logical inevitability of the agenda of the tort
reform movement, which at its core operates on the contention that society
does not truly need the legal system (at least not for any essential social
objective). If one is to suggest that the legal system is unnecessary, he must
also explain how the objectives it is thought to pursue would otherwise be
fulfilled. But in addition to being, as I suggest, a logical inevitability, it is
also rhetorically appealing. It posits that society is demeaned by its
acceptance of and reliance on the tort system, and that must be cast aside in
pursuit of higher values.
If one accepts my understanding of the case for tort reform, two
implications present how it should be addressed. First, refuting the myriad

_______________________________________________________
22

Galanter, Litigation Explosion, supra n. 1.
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components of the argument on a piecemeal basis is rather like cutting the
heads off a Hydra: it fails to address the essence of the challenge, and, while
it may parry the foe’s advance, the tactic is ultimately ineffectual. Second,
the case has a psychological, and not just rational, dimension. If one comes
to regard the tort system as a disempowering institution, it is of limited
consequence that, say, a particular critique of the uses of scientific evidence
rests on faulty premises. The broader implication of the argument against
the tort system, and the fear that it inspires, remains unaddressed.
In developing this argument, this article will proceed in three
sections. Section II provides a contextual framework for the argument
traced above. To this end, it will survey the claims that most commonly
have been advanced by proponents of tort reform. In doing so, it will draw
not only from articles and speeches by those advocating changes to the tort
system, but also from popular periodicals that advance similar types of
claims. In addition to surveying claims, this section will consider how
particular arguments function and the purpose they serve in advancing the
broader case for tort reform. In this sense, it is both foundational and
analytical. Section III will attempt to understand how these arguments
interact with one another to form a coherent whole. Section IV concludes
by considering the implications of my analysis for those who would seek to
refute the case for tort reform and by suggesting how the popular debate
regarding tort reform could be enriched.
II.

THE CONTENT OF THE CASE FOR TORT REFORM: AN ANALYTICAL
PRIMER

In this section, I survey the rhetorical landscape in attempting to
provide a sense of the component arguments of the case for tort reform. I
will divide the arguments into six categories: (1) criticism of lawyers; (2)
criticism of plaintiffs; (3) the “litigation explosion” (and the attendant
suggestion that we are becoming a “litigious society”); (4) the randomness
of the system; (5) the inordinate costs litigation entails; and (6) the
deficiencies of juries. They will be addressed in turn.
A.

The Arguments Against Lawyers

As a general matter, several variant, though interrelated, arguments
have been advanced as parts of the negative portrayal of “trial lawyers” that
underlies the case for tort reform.23 According to tort reformers, plaintiffs’

_______________________________________________________
23
The term “trial lawyers” is something of an imprecise manner in which to characterize the plaintiff’s
attorneys who appear to be the target of the case for tort reform. Cf. Alan Dershowitz, Steroetyping Trial
Lawyers: Dear Mr. President Stop Picking on Lawyers, Exhorts Dershowitz, Apr./May JD Jungle 24,
(2003) (available at
http://www.jdjungle.com/main.cfm?chID=0&schid=0&inc=INC_article.cfm&artid=50806&template=0
(noting that “trial lawyers” engage in many different sorts of litigation).
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lawyers wield influence on two levels. First, plaintiffs’ lawyers—trial
lawyers, as it were—are extraordinarily influential and are able to realize
their policy goals through manipulation of the political process and other
public channels. Second, they adeptly utilize the legal system for personal
enrichment. Both these contentions rest on a negative assessment of
lawyers’ character traits. These arguments will be discussed in turn.
1.

Lawyers as Manipulators Outside the Legal System

The notion that lawyers wield influence in shaping legislative policy
is based most directly upon the claim that they parlay vast wealth into
political access. An op-ed piece written by former Solicitor General
Theodore Olson in the Wall Street Journal contended that trial lawyers had
become “America’s ‘third political party,’ contributing more money to
political elections than any other segment of American society.” 24 The
American Tort Reform Foundation’s home page includes a search program
labeled “Tracking the Trial Lawyers.”25 By clicking on the link, the viewer
is directed to a page which displays the total amount of money donated by
“trial lawyers” to candidates for, respectively, the Presidency, Senate, House
of Representatives, and to party committees since January of 1999.26 One
may also narrow the search for a given state, race, or lawyer’s last name.27
The claims that were made against Senator John Edwards, a Democratic
candidate for President and former trial lawyer, by the Republican National
Committee took this contention regarding the inordinate influence of
lawyers a step further, arguing that his attainment of public office
represented a direct infiltration of the political process by the trial bar.28
One of its releases declared, “Edwards Isn’t Just Beholden to Personal
Injury Trial Lawyers, [sic] He Is One Himself.” 29 Once a trial lawyer,
always a trial lawyer, the argument implies.30

_______________________________________________________
24

Theodore B. Olson, Clinton's Payoffs to the Trial Lawyers, Wall St. J. A10 (Mar. 15, 1996).
See American Tort Reform Foundation, http://www.atrafoundation.org (accessed Dec. 30, 2005).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See Who Is John Edwards, http://www.davidsongop.com/edwards.htm (accessed, Dec. 30, 2005).
30
Suffice to say, the claim that lawyers essentially control the political process is oftentimes
accompanied by accounts of the personal wealth of members of the trial bar. See e.g. Michael Freedman,
Judgment Day, Forbes 132, (May 14, 2001). The article names the top ten highest paid plaintiff’s
lawyers from the year 2000. Regarding the second highest earner, Texas lawyer Fred Baron, it notes:
“The 53-year-old Baron founded Baron & Budd in 1977 and made a fortune in asbestos cases. His wife
Lisa Blue and partner Russell Budd led the Dallas firm in recovering an estimated $150 million in
asbestos claims in 2000, of which it kept $45 million. Baron, who prefers to handle other toxic tort cases,
is president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, whose political action committee gave $3.6
million to Democrats last year. He and his firm gave another $700,000—all to make sure tort reform
stays buried.” Id. See also Jeffrey O’Connell & Patrick B. Bryan, More Hippocrates, Less Hypocrisy:
“Early Offers” as a Means of Implementing the Institute of Medicine’s Recommendations on
Malpractice Law, 15 J.L. & Health 23, 43 (2001).
25
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Accompanying this line of rhetoric is the allegation that lawyers are
adept manipulators of imagery and argumentation, and as such they can
manipulate public discourse to suit their own ends. In part, this claim rests
upon the notion that the lawyers’ prowess at developing persuasive
arguments in support of a given position is not confined to the courtroom.
For instance, Walter K. Olson implores his readers to “[o]bserve how the
litigation lobby skillfully switches back and forth between presenting itself
as ‘public’ and as ‘private,’ the more deftly to obtain for itself the privileges
of both kinds of status and the responsibilities of neither.”31 Trial lawyers
wield this skill for disingenuous, but effective, argumentation to optimal
effect, the contention follows. As Max Boot noted in an op-ed in the Wall
Street Journal regarding one attorney:
[He] is not only a skilled manipulator of the media but he's
also hired a series of public relations companies to (as one
of the firms put it in a brochure) “establish the firm O'Quinn,
Kerensky & McAninch as the leading breast implant
litigation firm in Texas.” Thus his complaint about the
companies' defensive PR efforts – undertaken only after
they were swamped by bad publicity – is more than a little
disingenuous.32
Essentially, trial lawyers have both the skill and resources to capitalize upon
an unsuspecting public and a permissive media in the advancement of their
cause.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it is generally alleged that the trial
lawyers put this influence to the end of perpetuating the status quo, not
changing it. The final two chapters of Walter Olson’s recent book, The Rule
of Lawyers: How the New Litigation Elite Threatens America’s Rule of Law,
are devoted to explaining this contention.33 His account centers upon the
rejection of tort reform bills in the legislative arena, noting that the
politicians who did so were beholden—personally and politically—to the
trial lawyer “lobby.” 34 His overarching point is that the policies that
presently govern the litigation system operate to the benefit of lawyers, who
thus seek to foster “legislative gridlock.”35
2.

Lawyers Using the Legal System for Their Own Ends

_______________________________________________________
31

Walter K. Olson, The Rule of Lawyers: How the New Litigation Elite Threatens America’s Rule of Law,
303 (St. Martin’s Press 2003).
32
Max Boot, Rule of Law: King John’s Guide to Breast Implant Riches, Wall St. J. A21 (June 19, 1996).
This article and several others are cited as part and parcel of a thorough discussion regarding the media’s
favorable treatment of the case against trial lawyers. See Finzen & Tassoni, supra n. 21, at 525.
33
Boot, supra n. 32, at 261-314.
34
Olson, supra n. 31, at 266-77.
35
Id. at 287.
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Proponents of tort reform further contend that the trial lawyers are
able to manipulate the legal system for their own ends. It is perhaps a
tautology that most any argument about the deficiency of the legal system is
logically connected to trial lawyers. However, it should be noted, there are
two divergent lines of argumentation regarding trial lawyers’ effects on the
system. First, proponents of tort reform posit that lawyers are complicit
with other parties in bringing about certain negative effects through the legal
system. Their accomplices in this respect are, for instance, the plaintiffs
who bring frivolous suits and the juries who are deluded by clever
arguments into awarding vast sums of money. Second, though, they
contend that the lawyers themselves are primarily, if not entirely,
responsible for a certain set of ills that flow from the operation of the legal
system. In essence, these arguments are predicated upon the suggestion that
the trial lawyers wag the dog.
a.

Invalidation of Statutes

The first such argument is that lawyers are able to brandish the law
as a weapon, both in achieving the judicial invalidation of tort reform
measures which are enacted and in effecting extensions of existing law to
create more favorable (and lucrative) grounds for recovery. While this view
has been advanced by a number of commentators, it is perhaps notable that
law review articles have occasionally served as the vehicle for its delivery.
Victor Schwartz, a partner in a Washington law firm and a current or former
member of several advisory committees of the American Law Institute, has
been especially prominent in leveling this criticism of plaintiffs’ lawyers.36
For instance, in a recent article in the South Carolina Law Review, he (with
Leah Lorber) wrote:
Plaintiffs’ lawyers know that efforts to curb punitive
damages “run wild” will eventually eat into their profits.
They recognize that punitive damages are taxable under
federal law, while compensatory awards are not. . . .
Consequently, plaintiffs’ lawyers, as this Article will show,
have poured new wine of punishment evidence, once used
to obtain punitive damages, into old bottles of pain and
suffering awards.37
His analysis, however, focuses rather minimally on the motivations or
actions of lawyers and is primarily concerned instead with examining
developments in case law.38 Indeed, the only further mention of attorneys

_______________________________________________________
36
See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards: Turning
Compensation into “Punishment,” 54 S.C. L. Rev. 47 (2002).
37
Id. at 48-49.
38
Id. at 49-69.
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occurs when, in the course of noting that state courts had invalidated caps on
non-pecuniary damages, Schwartz observes that “[p]laintiffs’ lawyers in key
litigation states” had been at the forefront of the challenge to the
constitutionality of the measures. 39 Nonetheless, the article concludes by
reiterating its criticism of attorneys in a final rhetorical flourish, asserting
that “plaintiffs’ lawyers looking for the next deep pocket” can be “stopped
in [their] tracks if judges do the job they have taken an oath to do.”40 While
the resort to criticism of attorneys is, for the most part, relegated to the
periphery of the article, it establishes a thematic context within which the
analysis must be read—that is, to the extent courts have allowed the
expansion of legal doctrine, they have been either “activist judges” 41 or
otherwise deluded by the trial bar.42
This argument has been presented prominently in periodicals such
as the Wall Street Journal as well. For instance, one news article, detailing a
spate of decisions from state courts holding various tort reform measures to
be violative of state constitutions, commented, “Personal injury lawyers
don’t take defeat lying down. Unable to keep state legislatures from curbing
plaintiffs’ rights, these attorneys are fighting back in the forum they know
best: the courts.”43 In certain instances, this argument conflates the judges
who invalidate the laws with the trial lawyers themselves. For instance,
Walter Olson insinuated as much, writing in Fortune Magazine, “The folks
who get to implement tort reform are the same ones it is meant to constrain:
the judges on state courts. As skilled lawyers, they know a hundred ways
over, under, and around mere parchment barriers.”44
The sum and substance of the claim is that, when lawyers are unable
to prevail through the political process, despite the numerous advantages
their largesse confers upon them in that arena, they are able to command the
apparatus of the legal system to fend off the threat to their livelihood posed
by tort reform.
b.

Creation of Business

The second argument arising from the notion that trial lawyers
exploit the legal system is that they conceive of lawsuits they want to bring

_______________________________________________________
39

Id. at 61.
Id. at 70.
41
Id. at 61.
42
For additional law review articles with similar rhetoric regarding trial lawyers, see e.g. Victor E.
Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, & Leah Lorber, Tort Reform Past, Present, and Future: Solving Old
Problems and Dealing with “New Style” Litigation, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 237, 246 (2000) (“The
tactic of judicial nullification was developed by the plaintiffs’ bar as a response to successful state tort
reform efforts. . . . Plaintiffs’ lawyers further ‘game’ the legal system by relying on obscure state
constitutional provisions . . . .”).
43
Paul M. Barrett, Tort Reform Fight Shifts to State Courts, Wall St. J. 37 (Sept. 19, 1988).
44
Walter Olson, Why Business Loses in Court, Fortune 127 (May 23, 1988).
40
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and then recruit plaintiffs to facilitate them. By this argument, trial lawyers
conceive of new, and often innovative, avenues for recovery; the litigation
which follows is therefore more readily the result of lawyers’ greed than that
of the plaintiffs who ultimately collaborate in the venture. Most typically,
this criticism pertains to the class action context. For instance, Catherine
Crier, a former 20/20 correspondent who has since hosted shows on Fox
News and Court TV, alleges as much in her colorfully titled book, The Case
Against Lawyers: How the Lawyers, Politicians, and Bureaucrats Have
Turned the Law into an Instrument of Tyranny – and What We as Citizens
Have to Do About It. She writes:
Groups of lawyers regularly meet to peruse newspapers, the
Federal Register, and other publications for ideas. When
they find a “wrong,” they then troll for plaintiffs,
particularly in communities known to favor large awards
against the evils of corporate America.45
Olson’s book dedicates considerable space to the development of this
argument. While it is perhaps unnecessary to reproduce his argument here,
for it substantially resembles that advanced by Crier, the manner in which he
describes the lawyers themselves is significant. He suggests that “mass tort
litigation was following an entrepreneurial model” and that this resulted in
“a more or less continual stream of shareholder and investor actions against
big companies.”46 The point that seems to be advanced by this argument is
that, at least with respect to certain actions that are brought, the lawyers
themselves are the parties with the significant interest. By this token, the
litigation not only lacks a public purpose, but is an instrument in the
furtherance of a private, entrepreneurial venture. By induction, it suggests
the malleability of plaintiffs.
3.

The Composite Portrait of Lawyers

These arguments regarding lawyers are predicated upon a set of
common themes regarding lawyers and their role in society. 47 Professor
Galanter observes that there are three primary currents that appear to
underlie the public indictment of lawyers. First, they are “corrupters of
discourse,” which, in significant part, encompasses the notion that they

_______________________________________________________
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Catherine Crier, The Case Against Lawyers: How the Lawyers, Politicians, and Bureaucrats Have
Turned the Law into an Instrument of Tyranny – and What We as Citizens Have to Do About It 192
(Broadway Books 2002).
46
Olson, supra n. 31, at 84-85.
47
See generally Galanter, Predators, supra n. 1; Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of
Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 805 (1998). My
classification of arguments regarding lawyers is different from the one he uses, in that it heretofore has
segregated aspects of the critique which are centered on lawyers from those which concern other actors
as well. Nevertheless, the themes he identifies are apropos of this portion of my discussion here.
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adeptly engage in rhetorical sophistry in furtherance of their advocacy
efforts. 48 Second, they are “fomenters of strife,” provoking conflict and
controversy where there otherwise would have been social harmony. 49
Third, they are “economic predators,” essentially parasites who drain
society’s resources. 50 As Galanter insightfully notes, these negative
sentiments regarding lawyers correlate, in significant part, with what we
perceive to be the characteristics that assist them in their profession. To wit:
In the sins of discourse we can recognize the inventiveness
of lawyers and their obsession with precision and relevance.
Fomenting conflict mirrors the lawyer's zealous advocacy
and insistence on vindicating rights. In economic predation,
we see appreciation of the lawyer's prowess as an agent of
redistribution.51
Several additional observations, though not necessarily specific to the case
in favor of tort reform, but at the least more prominently featured in that
context, may warrant further mention. First, the lawyers are portrayed as a
cohesive unit, cooperating effectively to a common end. There is no sense
given that there is internal dissent within the community of lawyers, much
less that their interests might diverge with respect to any particular issue.
Indeed, it is occasionally suggested that the civil defense bar tacitly supports
the plaintiffs’ attorneys in order to justify their own fees.52 Second, lawyers
are, it is asserted, better able to wield influence than are their political
adversaries. It is rare that groups who would benefit from tort reform and
the resistance to trial lawyers they offer are even mentioned, and when they
are, they are cast as defenseless before the lawyers’ exertion of political
might.
B.

Arguments Against Plaintiffs

Alongside the arguments against lawyers, there are advanced a
series of criticisms that pertain directly to the individuals who choose to file
lawsuits. In part, these contentions relate to plaintiffs’ passive participation
in the lawyers’ expeditions. However, an entirely separate point emerges as
well: the idea that people should take personal responsibility for their

_______________________________________________________
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Galanter, Predators, supra n. 1, at 635.
Id. at 636.
50
Id. Galanter identifies a fourth theme, “Betrayers of Trust,” which is less prominent in the case for tort
reform. Id. The theme operates upon the notion that lawyers will, often without hesitation, turn on their
own clients. Because the case for tort reform rests, in significant part, upon the idea that lawyers and
plaintiffs seamlessly cooperate at the expense of society, see supra, it is perhaps unsurprising that this
theme does not permeate the arguments made by its proponents.
51
Id.
52
See e.g. Olson, supra n. 31, at 281 (noting that the 22,000 member Defense Research Institute
“regularly, if quietly, sends officials to legislative hearings to testify against proposed curbs on
litigation”).
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actions or otherwise refrain from filing most lawsuits and that the decision
to file a cause of action to gain redress for a grievance is therefore
inappropriate. These arguments operate upon common conceptions of
plaintiffs and are advanced within the context of broader normative
understandings of how society ought to be. Crier offers a simplified version
of the overarching point:
The omnipotence of the rule of law has altered our very
mind-set. The image of ourselves that we export, that of the
frontier-minded, self-reliant, and free-spirited American, is
all show. For every problem, there is someone or
something else responsible. . . . For every complaint, no
matter how worthless, there is an advocate.53
Three interrelated points, recurrent throughout the critique, may be drawn
from her paragraph. First, plaintiffs fail to accept responsibility for their
actions, and thus, instead seek monetary gain through the legal system. This
is contrary to the sort of social value structure upon which society should
operate, which includes self-sufficiency and a hardy resiliency. Second, this
increasing tendency on the part of members of society to attribute their own
failings to others has been, in significant part, facilitated and encouraged by
the legal system’s willingness to vindicate such claims. Third, and finally,
lawyers are willing to bring such tenuous cases. This third claim, functions
analogously to the argument that lawyers are able to conceive of new claims
and then recruit clients who will assert them. In both instances, plaintiffs
and lawyers complement one another—one conceives of the claim, and the
other cooperates in its prosecution. Society, the point concludes, cannot
count on either party to act as a check upon the profit-seeking impulses of
the other.
Because Crier’s short passage may not provide a complete sense of
the contours of the former two arguments, I discuss them each in greater
depth.54
1.

Plaintiffs Fail to Accept Personal Responsibility for their
Actions

The “personal responsibility” argument is not frequently developed
in a coherent and thorough manner; rather the term itself is asserted as an
objective good—i.e., that people should take personal responsibility for their
own failings—and it is then insinuated or explicitly indicated that plaintiffs

_______________________________________________________
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Crier, supra n. 45, at 21.
It is perhaps unnecessary to devote further attention to the point, occasionally made, but generally
implicit, that lawyers are loath to turn away viable claims, their questionable common sense merits aside.
54

Published by eCommons, 2005

256

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

have refused to accept it.55 In part, this may flow from the fact that the term
and the implications that it connotes have been commonly accepted for a
sufficiently long period of time that its very invocation is sufficient to
advance the argument, at least in shorthand form. In any event, as Professor
Douglas H. Cook notes, though the precise meaning of the term is somewhat
vague, its implications are discernible.56 He writes, “If all persons exercised
personal responsibility, would there be any real need for tort-based
compensation? The answer is no.”57 For Cook, this development would be
a positive one; by his reckoning, absent the tort system, “society may
progress in a direction where the first words uttered after an auto accident or
other injury are ‘Can I help?’ rather than ‘Can I sue?’”58
More typically, though, the term “personal responsibility” appears
to describe a particular type of frivolous lawsuit that plaintiffs purportedly
often file—i.e., one predicated upon tenuous claims regarding the
defendant’s negligence. (At least in theory, this can be contrasted with
those in which the injury suffered is dubious, though in practice, they
oftentimes dovetail with one another.) The paradigmatic example of such a
suit is the oft-ridiculed Liebeck case, better known as the “McDonald’s
Coffee case.”59 There, the plaintiff, an elderly woman, suffered severe burns
when the cup of coffee she had purchased at a McDonald’s drive-thru
window spilled in her lap.60 According to the tort reform argument, she
should have accepted that the accident was her own fault (for putting the hot
coffee in a precariously balanced position), rather than seeking recompense
through the legal system. Walter Olson’s website, www.overlawyered.com,
at one point included a collection of cases that appear to fit within the same
general mold. The page, labeled “archived personal responsibility items,”
grouped articles from newspapers into, inter alia, the following categories:
“blamed for suicides,” “warning labels and disclaimers,” “couldn’t help
eating it” [lawsuits against McDonalds and other restaurants related to the
fat content of food products], “sports risks,” “gambling,” and “hot
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55
See e.g. Richard B. Schmitt, Truth is the First Casualty of Tort-Reform Debate, Wall St. J. B1 (Mar. 7,
1995) (noting simply, “Mr. Meese says the case, which reform groups have been citing for a decade,
illustrates how a lack of personal responsibility has motivated unscrupulous lawyers and plaintiffs”);
Milo Geyelin, Knock at Clinton Puzzle legal Reforms, Wall St. J. B10 (Sept. 8, 1992) (“Legal reform has
never been a burning issue in Arkansas. The state’s rural culture, said former Insurance Commissioner
Rober Eubanks, embraces a community involvement and personal responsibility.”); Roger Parloff, Is Fat
The Next Tobacco?; For Big Food, the supersizing of America is becoming a big headache, Fortune 50
(Feb. 3, 2003) (“Though many people recoil at the idea of obesity suits – eating habits are a matter of
personal responsibility, they protest – the tobacco precedents show that such qualms can be overcome.”).
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Douglas H. Cook, Personal Responsibility and the Law of Torts, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 1245, 1249 (1996).
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Id.
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Id. at 1274.
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Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. 1994).
60
For a summary of the Liebeck case and its popular satirization, see Mark B. Greenlee, Kramer v. Java
World: Images, Issues, and Idols in the Debate Over Tort Reform, 26 Cap. U. L. Rev. 701 (1997).
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beverages.”61 A block of text beneath the compilation of anecdotes noted,
perhaps as a crystallizing insight, that, as a result of various trends in the
evolution in legal doctrine, “today’s American legal environment is [one] in
which plaintiffs routinely try their luck at suits after being injured climbing
high-voltage utility structures while drunk, skinny-dipping in icy pools with
captive killer whales, trying ‘wheelies’ and other stunts on industrial
forklifts, and smoking for decades.”62
A related point is that the law encourages plaintiffs to sue in such
instances by virtue of its asserted permissiveness. The core of this
contention is, intuitively, that because the court system grants relief in such
frivolous cases, plaintiffs have a strong incentive to file suit. On his website,
Olson notes:
Most states moved from contributory negligence to
comparative negligence, which allows a plaintiff whose
negligence helped cause an accident to sue over it anyway,
though for a reduced recovery. Waivers and disclaimers
began to be struck down as unconscionable, against public
policy, not spelled out with sufficient clarity, etc. . . . The
result is today's American legal environment . . .63
In essence, this argument appears to suggest, plaintiffs will seek recovery
wherever the law enables them to do so. Interestingly, this presents the law
as a classic enabler, something that should interpose an obstacle to a harmful
course of action, but fails to do so. In short, the law fails to act as a check
on the plaintiffs who, the argument goes, crowd the entrance of the
courthouse.
2.

Plaintiffs File Frivolous Lawsuits

The final argument specially pertaining to the character and
disposition of plaintiffs is perhaps the most familiar: that plaintiffs file
frivolous lawsuits based upon dubious injuries. In this sense, it poses an
effective complement to the point about personal responsibility—whereas
one of them is chiefly about questionable theories of liability, the other
about incredible claims of damages. Of course, the two can, and often do,
intersect in individual cases. But as a conceptual matter, they can be seen as
discrete.
By the terms of the argument, plaintiffs seek to exploit the legal
system for profit, rather than, seek redress for severe and serious injuries;

_______________________________________________________
61
Overlawyered, Archived Personal Responsibility Items, Pre-July 2003,
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they are, succinctly put, “golddiggers.”64 The familiar image the argument
conjures is that of the man wearing a neck brace in the courtroom for the
benefit of the jury, but who no doubt will remove it once a verdict is
delivered. It may also extend to allegations of injuries that would strike the
observer, on an intuitive level, as odd, or even inane. For instance,
Professor Galanter recounts a case in which a woman alleged that the dye
from a CAT scan procedure had extinguished her psychic powers and
caused her welts and other skin irritations.65 The trial judge dismissed the
claim regarding her lost clairvoyance, but allowed the physical injuries to go
to the jury, which, in turn, awarded her $988,000.66 Though the appellate
court ultimately ordered a new trial with respect to damages, the story
entered popular lore as a paradigmatic example of what was wrong with the
tort system. It was referenced not only by Peter Huber in his book, Junk
Science, but in speeches by President Ronald Reagan.67 Certainly, the story
was popular fodder for proponents of tort reform because it involved the
intersection of several of their lines of criticism (greedy or otherwise
unsympathetic plaintiffs, impressionable juries, and crushing damages). But
suffice to say, the presence of an intuitively frivolous claim serves as an
instrumental component of the point.
It is further important to note that the term “frivolous lawsuits”
encompasses more than cases in which an alleged injury is questionable.
Additionally, it includes cases where the injury is not physical, or even
psychological, at all, as where a litigant seeks vindication of an intuitively
suspect claim of right or duty as against another party. For instance, on his
website, Walter Olson discussed one such case:
“Parents may stop helping out on their kid's teams if a
Springbank lawyer successfully sues volunteers within his
own son's league, says the head of minor hockey in
Calgary. . . . Michael Kraik is suing the Springbank Minor
Hockey Association because he says his nine-year-old son
Alexander was deliberately placed on a weaker team due to
favouritism [sic] from league officials for their own
children.” The suit seeks C$50,000 [sic] and names two
officials individually.68
Anecdotes such as this one extend the point that plaintiffs are filing suits
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Greenlee, supra n. 60, at 709.
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Id. at 727.
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Id. at 728-729.
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primarily in pursuit of undeserved financial gain, rather than redress of
grievous injuries.
C.

Too Many Lawsuits/The Litigation Explosion

These accounts of plaintiffs, lawyers, and lawsuits beget a separate,
though closely related, criticism of the legal system: that it has placed
society in the throes of a litigation explosion. It is fairly evident that the
term “litigation explosion,” a colorful expression of the notion that too many
lawsuits are filed, is intended to appear as an observation regarding a posited
trend in the legal system.69 It takes the portrayals of plaintiffs anxious to file
suit and lawyers eager to assist them (or vice versa) and extrapolates it
outwards to observe the development of a trend. However, it builds upon
them as well, and in so doing, subtly recasts the argument being made. It is
not so much a point about the actions of individuals or groups, but rather,
takes the form of an observation about a natural phenomenon. As an
editorial in USA Today noted:
Everybody in the USA suddenly seems to want to sue
anybody with liability insurance coverage. The explosion
of litigation has choked court dockets. And too-few lawyers
tell potential clients that some cases are a waste of time. . . .
The greed has turned the temple of justice, long a hallowed
place, into a pigsty. The time has come to clean it up.70
The extent to which it is afforded explanatory credibility makes it a
convenient springboard for other arguments. 71 For instance, in an article
regarding “America’s Worst Judges,” Max Boot writes:
A state appeals court eventually tossed out the smelly-water
award, finding that Judge Fostel had allowed the plaintiffs
to admit junk science and had wrongly ruled that their
claims weren't barred by the statute of limitations. That
the case even got that far raises serious questions about
whether the litigation explosion is compromising the
integrity of the judiciary.72
The observation that there are too many lawsuits is a premise, an assumption,
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What may be surprising about the litigation explosion is the extent to which it has attained popular
credibility. For a discussion of this point, see e.g. Randy M. Mastro, The Myth of the Litigation
Explosion, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 199, 201 (1991).
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or an assertion accepted as fact. The manner in which it is couched—an
“explosion”—creates an ambience of crisis, and the evident need to address
the matter becomes a virtual imperative. As the above-quoted passages may
reflect, 73 the use of the term “litigation explosion” places a patina of
empiricism upon the critique and thereby facilitates the deployment of
further points regarding the trend.
In The Collapse of the Common Good,74 Philip K. Howard purports
to offer an explanation as to why American culture has evolved in such a
way. The book, it could fairly be said, is about the effects of the ostensibly
litigious culture on the remainder of society. Nevertheless, he suggests an
explanation for the rise of this mindset. Howard argues that an excessive
cultural affinity for the jurisprudence and logic of “individual rights” leads
Americans to accept, unquestioningly, “that being sued is the price of
freedom.”75 The result is a “rhetorical society dedicated to individual selfinterest.”76 This argument, in linking plaintiffs’ apparent inclination to sue
to a sociocultural trend, operates to the same effect as does Olson’s
argument that the law has become more accommodating of them. In either
event, plaintiffs are encouraged to sue by a permissive social and legal
climate; the primary difference is that Howard’s version attempts to offer
additional explanation for the development of the legal climate itself.
The significance of this point may be subtle, but should not be
underestimated. In parlaying the conceptualization of plaintiffs into
something more general, the argument for tort reform becomes as much a
desire to remedy social costs as monetary ones. It suggests that society
interacts with the legal system in harmful ways and that reliance upon courts
rends the moral fabric of the culture itself. By this token, plaintiffs who file
frivolous lawsuits cannot safely be regarded as them; to the contrary, they
are a reflection on or of us. Tort reform, then, is a way to save society from
itself by reasserting the importance of vital social values.
As suggested above, the litigation explosion argument provides a
segue way into a series of arguments about the costs of lawsuits for society
as a whole. As a general proposition, proponents of tort reform tend to
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identify three sets of costs that result from the apparent proliferation of
lawsuits: (1) those sustained by the courts; (2) costs from paying for
lawsuits; and (3) consequences of fearing the possibility of lawsuits. They
will be discussed in turn.
1.

Costs for the Courts

First, proponents of tort reform argue that the courts, having been
deluged with frivolous lawsuits, are unable to perform their appropriate
function effectively. This is a less emphasized point, perhaps because it
lacks rhetorical force or because the upshot of the case for tort reform is to
minimize the role appropriately vested with the courts in the first instance.
In any event, the basic point is that courts are unable to tend to legitimate
business because of the monumental exertion of effort required to filter out
frivolous lawsuits. For example, a news article in the Wall Street Journal
noted that “[a]s the litigation explosion has hit the appeals courts, they have
responded by disposing of more cases summarily, often refusing to hear oral
argument and sometimes omitting written reasons for decision.” 77 As a
result, it follows, the reliability and quality of the judgments rendered by
these courts is diminished.
2.

Costs from Paying Lawsuits

A second variant of the costs from paying lawsuits is that American
businesses and organizations, deluged with lawsuits, are forced to modify
their behavior, ultimately resulting in adverse consequences for the
recipients of their services.78 In its most common form, this argument posits
that, as a result of costs sustained by virtue of litigation, an organization
cannot afford to provide the products or services people expect. For
example, an op-ed piece in the Washington Times, authored by three United
States Senators, contended that non-profit organizations were unable to
continue their activities because defending against lawsuits had become
inordinately costly.79 The article asserted that “[n]onprofits must spend an
increasing amount of time and resources preparing for, avoiding and/or
fighting lawsuits.”80 As a result, the article continues, certain organizations
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must cease their activities altogether, while others must direct scarce
financial resources to fund legal defense efforts, rather than devoting them
to the provision of socially beneficial services. 81 The Red Cross, most
prominently, “must self insure,” and thus, is left with “fewer funds available
for providing services than would otherwise be the case.”82
More frequently than charities, businesses are cast as the
unfortunate bearers of the costs of litigation. Another article in the
Washington Times notes, “[w]hether ATLA admits it or not, whole
industries are being crippled by a civil justice system dependent on junk
science. And new medical advances that save lives and demonstrably help
people are being flushed down the river because of the same junk-science
tort fever.”83 The assertion that underlies this argument—that lawsuits are
an encumbrance of business activities—can be extrapolated to a systemic
level as well. For example, in a speech to the American Bar Association,
Vice President Dan Quayle asserted that the “litigation explosion” was
placing the nation at a “competitive disadvantage” to foreign businesses.84
Consumers, for their part, sustain the costs of litigation in the form of a “tort
tax,” which, Max Boot contends, “costs America an estimated $132 billion
annually, a toll that no other country in the world bears.”85
The argument about the consequences of lawsuits for businesses is
often presented as one about the effects of the development for individuals.86
Perhaps the paradigmatic incarnation of the individual hurt by the litigation
explosion is the doctor who can no longer afford to pay his insurance
premiums. Indeed, the notion that doctors require relief from perpetually
escalating insurance costs has been a significant impetus for the recent effort
to implement liability caps in malpractice cases. In a series of talking points
about the “medical liability reform,” the American Medical Association
asserted that “[s]kyrocketing medical liability premiums . . . are forcing
physicians to limit services, retire early, or move to a state with reforms

_______________________________________________________
81

Id.
Id.
Nesbit, supra n. 78. For additional articles about the effects of the litigation explosion on American
businesses, see e.g. James R. Norman, Smart Timing, Forbes 170 (Nov. 25, 1991) (noting that insurance
companies are “spending like mad just to tread water”); Jerry Flint, The Bird Man of Torrance, Forbes 64
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where premiums are more stable.”87 As a result, the point follows, doctors
are compelled by economic forces they cannot control to abandon activities
that are important to them, i.e., the opportunity to engage in a rewarding
medical practice. In an article urging the necessity of tort reform, Dr.
Donald Palmisano related an anecdote about an obstetrician who had been
forced to forego her practice and her regret at having to do so:
[The doctor] stood hand-in-hand with her pregnant patient.
She told the crowd, “Helping a woman deliver her baby is
the most extraordinary experience a doctor can have. And I
won’t be doing that anymore.” Her liability premiums
tripled. She had no choice but to give up the part of her
practice she treasured most. It’s a loss beyond calculation-both for her and her patients.88
The imposition of greater costs on physicians, in turn, is asserted to bear
significant consequences for their individual patients. As Dr. Palmisano
further noted:
In South Texas, a pregnant woman showed up in a
physician’s office just 10 minutes from delivery. She was
trying to drive 80 miles to her doctor in San Antonio
because her original physician had stopped delivering
babies.
In Arizona, a nurse from a hospital that had closed its
maternity ward gave birth by the side of the road before she
could reach the region’s only remaining maternity ward 40
miles away.89
Anecdotes such as those offered by Dr. Palmisano extend the argument
about the negative effects of rising insurance costs by presenting them from
a more immediately human perspective.
This reorientation in argumentative perspective complements the
broader contention about the implications of the higher costs in insurance by
suggesting an additional effect it generates: preventing the exercise of
individual choice and the satisfaction of personal preferences. In this sense,
it extends the discussion of the toll imposed on American business by
positing a separate and distinct normative reason why it is undesirable.
While the broad argument about the effects of litigation costs for business
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are most immediately about efficiency, the microcosmic point about
individuals takes on the additional question of fairness. That this is true of
the anecdote about the doctors is relatively intuitive. Dr. Palmisano’s story
of the unfortunate obstetrician is undergirded by the intuition that
individuals who have worked to become doctors deserve the opportunity to
practice their chosen profession (and to practice it in the way they want to).
Though perhaps more delicately, his anecdote about patients also poses an
issue of equity; it trades on an underlying value—that is, that people deserve
to be able to readily obtain particular services. In addition to being
inefficient and unsafe for pregnant women to be traversing large portions of
South Texas in search of an obstetrician, it is also unfair to them. Why, Dr.
Palmisano would presumably query, should a pregnant woman have to drive
significant distances to obtain services she desperately needs?90
3.

Costs of Fear

Finally, the litigation explosion has been alleged to impose costs on
society by deterring individuals from engaging in even innocuous conduct
for fear of being sued.91 An article that graced the cover of Newsweek both
illustrates the mechanics of this argument and provides evidence of the
extent to which it has gained popularity. The front of the magazine depicted
three individuals: a reverend, a doctor, and a sheriff.92 Written across the
three of them was the headline: “Lawsuit Hell: How Fear of Litigation is
Paralyzing Our Professions.” 93 The article then discussed, among other
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in our schools, creating ‘defensive teaching’ and undermining the ability of educators to use their best
judgment in day-to-day decisions.” Common Good, Defensive Teaching in Our Public Schools,
http://cgood.org/schools-reading-cgpubs-polls-4.html (Mar. 24, 2004).
For additional citations
concerning the purported costs imposed by lawsuits in public schools, see infra n. 91.
91
See e.g. George F. Will, Lawsuit Culture, Wash. Post B7 (June 2, 2002) (“Americans are not losing
their minds, but they are afraid of using their minds. They are afraid to exercise judgment – afraid of
being sued.”); George S. McGovern & Alan K. Simpson, We’re Reaping What We Sue, Wall St. J. A20
(Apr. 17, 2002) (“Legal fear drives [doctors] to prescribe medicines and order tests, even invasive
procedures, that they feel are unnecessary. . . . There is a culprit here: our legal system.”); Steve Forbes,
Fact and Comment, http://www.forbes.com/global/2003/0331/ 009.html (Mar. 31, 2003) (“Caps won’t
allay the fear that now grips medical practitioners.”); Stuart Taylor, Jr., How More Rights Have Made Us
Less Free, 34 Natl. J. No. 6 (Feb. 9, 2002) (discussing Philip K. Howard’s work).
For citations concerning public schools in particular, see e.g. Mortimer B. Zuckerman,
Welcome to Sue City U.S.A., 134 U.S. News & World Rpt. 64 (June 16, 2003) (“Teachers who are firm
with badly behaved students know all too well that they run the risk of being sued by parents who smell
money more than they seek justice.”); Andrew Mollison, Miller: Limit Suits Against Schools, Atlanta J.Const. 4A (May 12, 2004) (reporting that Sen. Zell Miller intended to introduce “legislation designed to
diminish fears among school officials of ‘being blindsided by a lawsuit’”); Sid Langley, Perspective: To
the Manners Born; Think Your’re a Modern Man, Birmingham Post A10 (Apr. 26, 2004) (“Teachers
virtually have to consult a lawyer before they speak to an errant child, trips are cancelled for fear of
lawsuits by disgruntled parents should anything go wrong.”)
92
Newsweek, cover, (Dec. 15, 2004).
93
Id.
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things, the extent to which individuals and organizations are reluctant to
engage in courses of conduct that could expose them to suit. For example, it
noted, “Playgrounds all over the country have been stripped of monkey bars,
jungle gyms, high slides and swings . . . . The reason: thousands of lawsuits
by people who hurt themselves at playgrounds.”94 The article proceeded to
recount a series of anecdotes from such community-minded individuals as a
little league organizer afraid of being sued if somebody fractured a limb
during a game,95 several school board members who “fear that parents will
sue for anything,”96 and a Methodist minister who refrains from hugging
parishioners in order to ensure that he will not be accused of inappropriate
sexual contact.97 The Newsweek article quoted liberally from Howard, in
whose books and editorials this argument has been especially prevalent.98
The argument is predicated upon the notion that whatever
apprehensiveness is harbored by professionals is not irrational or unfounded,
but rather, is the product of the “pervasive distrust” between them and their
clients or customers that is engendered by a societal embrace of the legal
system as a mechanism for resolving grievances.99 As a result, the argument
follows, the quality of services that are provided even to people who would
not entertain the idea of filing a lawsuit is precipitously diminished.
Howard’s organization, Common Good, ventures that, in the
medical profession excessive litigation has resulted in the practice of
“unnecessary defensive medicine” and caused “[h]onesty and candor, vital
to improving health care systems [to be] supplanted by a culture of legal
fear.”100 Analogously, in the educational context, Common Good contends
that “education is a human enterprise and [is] bound to fail if the humans
involved, fearful of legal proceedings or constraints, do not feel comfortable
drawing on their personality and emotions to inspire, console and cajole
students.”101
D.

Criticisms of the System

The final overarching category of argument advanced by proponents
of tort reform is that the legal system resolves particular cases in
counterintuitive ways. While the arguments that have been examined in the
previous sections have pertained primarily to the actors who use the legal
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Stuart Taylor, Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, Newsweek 42, 44 (Dec. 15, 2004).
Id. at 44.
96
Id. at 47.
97
Id. at 43.
98
Id. at 46-48.
99
Philip K. Howard, Legal Malpractice, Wall St. J. A16 (Jan. 27, 2003).
100
Common Good, Sign Our Petition for A New System of Medical Justice, http://cgood.org/healthcare52.html (accessed Jan. 1, 2006).
101
Common Good, Is Law Undermining Public Education?, http://cgood.org/schools-events-5.html
(accessed Jan. 1, 2006).
95
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system and the effects of their conduct on society, this species of contention
impugns the credibility of the system itself. The upshot of the argument is
that, even to the extent that the legal system could in theory perform
legitimate functions, it is not practically exercising the authority allocated to
it. As a general matter, this critique is premised on the assertion that the
legal system does not, at the end of the day, reach sensible results—that is,
intuitively frivolous claims are translated into legally meritorious, even
lucrative, ones.
In propounding this argument, many proponents of reform call the
tort system a “litigation lottery.” By this, they mean to suggest both that
those who choose to take part in the process as plaintiffs are seeking
financial gain and that a case’s chances of success are not entirely bound up
in the merits of the predicate claim.102 In this vein, a paper published by the
Department of Health and Human Services noted, “The system permits a
few plaintiffs and their lawyers to impose what is in effect a tax on the rest
of the country to reward a very small number of patients who happen to win
the litigation lottery.” 103 While the lottery metaphor aptly captures the
essence of the critique, the point about the arbitrariness of the legal system
is advanced in other, more general, terms as well. Advocating caps on
medical malpractice damages, President Bush contended that “[t]he
unpredictability of our liability system means that even frivolous cases—
people call them junk lawsuits—carry the risk of enormous burdens.” 104
Still more frequently, the point is put as an observation as to the prevalence
of out of control damage awards.105
Underlying the assertion that the legal system is random are several
subsidiary contentions as to why that might be the case. The most
prominent of these contentions is the suggestion that juries are easily misled,
both by adept trial lawyers and their own emotions, and as such, tend to
dispense excessive verdicts incommensurate with the severity of the

_______________________________________________________
102
See e.g. Dan Quayle, Clinton is Right on Tort Problem, Wrong on Solution, Wall St. J. A12 (May 27,
1993) (“All consumers and companies are funding the litigation lottery. Americans are encouraged
to play this game of chance by the plaintiffs' bar, perhaps the only group that benefits from excess litigati
on.”). At times, it is used only in the former of these senses. See e.g. Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A.
Behrens & Cary Silverman, I’ll Take That: Legal and Public Policy Problems Raised by Statutes That
Require Punitive Damages Awards to be Shared with the State¸ 68 Mo. L. Rev. 525, 534 (2003) (noting
that reports “of individuals receiving enormous sums of money in lawsuits are one reason why many in
the public have come to view the civil justice system as a ‘litigation lottery’”).
103
Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Innovative Practice Applications, 6 DePaul J. Health Care L. 309,
311 (2003).
104
Joseph Curl, Bush Says “Junk” Lawsuits Hurting Health Industry, Wash. Times A4 (July 26, 2002).
105
See e.g. Ashlea Ebeling, Protect Your Assets: How to Keep Your Money out of Trial Lawyers’ Pockets,
Forbes 142 (May 12, 2003); Ira Carnahan, Deliverance: Two physicians help obstetricians avoid
errors—and malpractice suits. So where are the profits?, Forbes 311 (Sept. 20, 2002) (noting “with jury
awards in medical malpractice cases averaging $3.5 million, doctors and insurers are running scared”).
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plaintiff’s actual injury.106 Caps on pain and suffering damages are often
advocated quite explicitly as a mechanism by which to ensure that “overly
sympathetic juries” will not order excessive damages.107 This portrayal of
juries tends to rest on the imputation of several characteristics to jurors as a
whole. First, they are exceptionally susceptible to the persuasive abilities of
trial lawyers and, relatedly, to the influence of their own emotions. 108
Second, they are vindictive and parochial when confronted with cases
involving non-local parties.
As Walter Olson contends, “When
[international businessmen] get together, they swap the latest stories about
seemingly routine disputes in the South that suddenly ignited . . . into
massive damage awards.”109
These contentions imply two broader points about the jury system
itself. First, the awards juries deliver are not, as a general matter,
commensurate with the value or merit of the claim that is put before them.
Whether due to their exaggerated emotions or their distaste for out-of-state
defendants, juries determine the resolution of particular cases with reference
to concerns unrelated to the facts or legal standards before them. Second, as
an institution, the jury system is easily manipulated by trial lawyers. This is
most evident in the line of contention concerning their manipulability. But
it is also implicit in the contention that certain juries, particularly those
drawn from Southern states, are eager to deliver punitively large awards
against foreign defendants; for if a lawyer is aware that jurors from a
particular locale will be conducive to his case, he will be likely to venue his
case there when presented, by legal rules, the opportunity to do so.110
III.

REASSEMBLING THE CASE FOR TORT REFORM

_______________________________________________________
106
See e.g. Bush Challenges Congress on Liability Reform, Wash. Times A18 (Jan. 23, 2003) (quoting
President Bush as stating, “Excessive jury awards will continue to drive up insurance costs, put good
doctors out of business or run them out of your community”).
107
Legal Reform, Our View: Citizens, plaintiffs, and defendants alike deserve justice that’s consistent,
not lawsuit roulette, U.S.A. Today A12 (Dec. 18, 1996).
108
See Louisiana Jackpot, Wall St. J. A14 (Sept. 18, 1997) (“None of this reality mattered to the jury,
which was looking for someone with deep pockets. Stymied because it couldn’t go after [an exempt
party], it settled on [a different one]. The jury, of course, was encouraged to reach this decision by the
plaintiff’s lawyers, whose notion of justice has more to do with how much money they can siphon off for
themselves than how much they can help their clients.”); Smelly Verdict, Wall St. J. A18 (Mar. 18, 1996)
(advocating “more comprehensive limits on punitive damages [awarded] at the whim of juries”); Robert
H. Bork & Theodore B. Olson, Trial Lawyers and Other Closet Federalists, Wash. Times A21 (Mar. 9,
1995) (“Juries dispense lottery-like windfalls, attracting and rewarding imaginative claims and farfetched legal theories.”)
109
Olson, supra n. 31, at 209-10. See also Dr. Gore and Mr. Slick, Wall St. J. A14 (Oct. 11, 1995)
(“Alabama juries seem to view the civil justice system like a speed trap–a way to shake down
unsuspecting out-of-staters.”).
110
See Olson, supra n. 31, at 210-36. In a chapter called “The Jackpot Belt,” he argues that lawyers avail
themselves of this tendency on the part of juries, arguing, “When the confused, demagogue-led, or
corrupt rural county hands down its ruling in one of these cases, it not only makes law that the rest of the
country is the obliged to live with but effectively engages in interstate commerce itself.” Id. at 236.
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The previous section of this article was primarily concerned with
dissecting the case for tort reform into its component arguments. This
section attempts to put it back together in an ordered fashion that accounts
for the symbiotic relationship that the discrete arguments have with one
another. It proceeds on two levels. First, it briefly diverts to consider a set
of preliminary objections that one might have to the idea that the various
arguments advanced by proponents of tort reform should be understood as
operating in a coherent way. Second, hopefully having dispatched these
objections to the endeavor itself, this section will attempt to develop an
informed understanding of the manner in which the case for tort reform, as a
comprehensive whole, functions.
A.

Addressing Preliminary Objections

The argument that has been tentatively advanced herein is
predicated upon the supposition that there is a composite case for tort
reform and that, by careful analysis, the relationship between its disparate
parts are reconcilable to a composite model. However, one could potentially
contend that the case for tort reform, as I have characterized it, is merely a
collection of divergent arguments and observations that have a common
implication—that is, that there should be a retrenchment of liability rules in
the tort system. As such, the objection would follow, any order that can be
identified amidst the chaos is accidental at best, and artificial at worst. And
certainly, by this token, whatever common currents can be identified as
running through variant arguments were not intended by their proponents.
Before addressing the substance of this objection, it may be valuable
first to offer a caveat to my argument: I do not mean to suggest that the
various proponents have devised, fully formed, a composite battle plan for
an attack on the tort system. My contention, instead, is that the myriad
arguments for tort reform are predicated upon a generally consistent
understanding about the reliability of the legal system, its effects on the
country’s economy and culture, and the role it appropriately should play in
American society. While there is not necessarily perfect uniformity among
these arguments, they originate in common impulses and are advanced in
pursuit of a common end. My analysis is intended to illuminate the
objective characteristics of the arguments that have been injected into the
public sphere and not the subjective intentions of their proponents.
This qualification aside, this potential objection to my argument
should fail for several reasons. First, whether or not proponents of tort
reform have intended for their arguments to cohere, the public, as consumers
of these contentions, so experiences them. As a set of arguments in favor of
a common proposal exist in the public sphere, it is unlikely that they would
be digested as discrete, temporally confined events, rather than assimilated
into a more comprehensive understanding of the purported problem. Second,
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the previous section of this article notwithstanding, the arguments in favor
of tort reform are not typically advanced in topical pigeonholes. To the
contrary, they are presented alongside one another with substantial
coherence. For instance, the following statements are drawn from prefaces
of two prominent indictments of the tort system, Walter Olson’s website and
Catherine Crier’s book:
Overlawyered.com explores an American legal system that
too often turns litigation into a weapon against guilty and
innocent alike, erodes individual responsibility, rewards
sharp practice, enriches its participants at the public’s
expense, and resists even modest efforts at reform and
accountability.111
The Case Against Lawyers is both an angry indictment and
an eloquent plea for a return to common sense. It decries a
system of laws so complex even the enforcers – such as the
IRS – cannot understand them. It unmasks a litigationcrazed society where billion-dollar judgments mostly line
the pockets of personal injury lawyers. It deplores the
stupidity of a system of liability that leads to such results as
a label on a stroller that warns, “Remove child before
folding.” It indicts a criminal justice system that puts minor
drug offenders away for life yet allows celebrity murderers
to walk free. And it excoriates the sheer corruption of the
iron triangle of lawyers, bureaucrats, and politicians who
profit mightily from all this inefficiency, injustice, and
abuse . . .112
B.

The Anatomy of the Case for Tort Reform

1.

A Note on Organization and Methodology

In this section, I discuss the various facets of the case for tort reform
preliminarily discussed in Section II, supra. I suggest how the arguments,
and the assumptions that underlie them, complement one another in
advancing the case for tort reform. What I have posited to be the case for
tort reform is more than a collection of proactive arguments—to the
contrary, it rests on normative and descriptive assumptions and contentions
about societal values and the appropriate role of the legal system itself. If
arguments about the various moral deficiencies of lawyers and the legal
system are the meat of the case for tort reform, it is likewise important to
note that a set of underlying assumptions can be seen to constitute its

_______________________________________________________
111
112

See Overlawyered, Home Page, http://www.overlawyered.com (accessed Jan. 1, 2006).
See Crier, supra n. 45 (quoting from the book’s jacket).
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infrastructure.
My burden in discussing this topic is twofold. First, and quite
obviously, the analysis developed in this section must make logical sense—
that is, it must draw appropriate inferences about different arguments that
have been advanced and explain them in a convincing way. Second, and
perhaps more difficult, my analysis must meet an empirical burden. There
is a great variety of material floating about the public sphere concerning the
tort system. This article purports to explain not individual accounts by
individual authors on their own terms, but rather, the comprehensive case
for tort reform. I must demonstrate that my analysis is broadly applicable to
arguments emanating from a variety of persons and sources, rather than
confined to the set I have chosen to discuss.
In order to meet this empirical burden, each section of the analysis
that follows will operate on both a general and specific level. On the
general level, this article will draw material from books and articles
authored by proponents of tort reform. By characterizing this component of
the analysis as “general,” I mean to suggest that the common thread running
through the materials treated is a shared perspective regarding the
appropriate nature and scope of tort law, and not necessarily a particularized
policy objective. On the “specific” level, I will concentrate on a recent
Senate debate regarding medical practice liability reform, the specific
parameters of which will be set forth more fully shortly. This component of
the discussion will demonstrate that the aspects of the more general
literature I identify are imported into a specific debate in a real and
prominent way. It should, I hope, preemptively refute any suggestion that I
am merely “cherry picking” phrases or arguments from available accounts
and drawing unwarranted or inordinately sweeping generalizations from
them. Moreover, consideration of the structure of a narrow segment of the
broader tort debate will provide some sense of the manner in which general
arguments subtly vary or expand in form when brought to bear on a
particular issue.
The specific level component of the discussion that follows in this
section will be concerned with the debate that took place with respect to
President Bush’s proposal in early 2003 to implement caps on nonpecuniary damages in medical malpractice cases.
In early 2003, President Bush and House Republicans advanced a
proposal to “place strict limits on jury awards in medical malpractice
lawsuits.” 113 Though the proposal was hardly unprecedented—similar

_______________________________________________________
113
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Plan to Curb Malpractice Awards Advances to Full House, N.Y. Times
A17 (Mar. 6, 2003).
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legislation had passed the House of Representatives the year before114—the
president prominently and forcefully advocated it during a speech to a
conference of members of the American Medical Association, and it
received considerable media coverage.115 During his speech, Bush intoned,
“There are too many frivolous lawsuits against good doctors, and the
patients are paying the price . . . . [S]omething which affects our budget so
significantly requires a national solution.”116 An article published by the
New York Times News Service later noted that Bush had made
“overhauling the nation’s medical liability laws a centerpiece of his
domestic agenda.”117
The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives shortly
thereafter, sponsored by Representative James C. Greenwood, and on March
13, 2003 it passed in that chamber on a vote of 229-196, largely upon party
lines. 118 At the time, Bush hailed the House vote as “an important step
towards creating a liability system that fairly compensates those who are
truly harmed, punishes egregious misconduct without driving good doctors
out of medicine and improves access to quality affordable health care by
reducing health-care costs.”119 However, the legislation stalled in the Senate
and was eventually defeated on a procedural resolution by a vote of 49-48,
also cast predominantly along party lines.120
The House and Senate bills were substantially similar to one another,
especially in their most publicly discussed provisions. The Senate bill was
titled the “Patients First Act of 2003,” and was introduced by eleven
Republican senators, including Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN), a former
surgeon.121 The stated purpose of the provision was “[t]o protect patients’
access to quality and affordable health care by reducing the effects of
excessive liability costs.” 122 In order to carry out this objective, the bill
proposed a litany of measures, including: a statute of limitations on injuries
of three years after the “date of the manifestation of injury or 1 year after the
claimant discovers, or . . . should have discovered, the injury, whichever
occurs first;”123 a cap of $250,000 on “noneconomic damages;”124 ceilings
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Pres. George W. Bush, supra n. 16.
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Id. at ¶¶ 20, 30.
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Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Votes to Cap Malpractice Awards, Chi. Trib. A13 (Mar. 14, 2003).
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David Rogers, House Passes Medical-Malpractice Litigation Bill, Wall St. J. A3 (Mar. 14, 2003).
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on contingency fees that could be paid to lawyers;125 and stringent limits on
when punitive damages could be awarded.126
2.

Unpacking the Case for Tort Reform

With this contextual background established, this section turns to
consider the structure of the case for tort reform. In advancing its analysis,
it will operate upon three overarching levels: (1) the role proponents of tort
reform believe the legal system properly should play; (2) the way the legal
system presently functions—i.e., the factors that drive its decisions—and
how it fits into the critique; and (3) tort reformers’ conception of society
itself and their ultimate understanding of why tort reform is necessary. As
will be demonstrated, these categories are conceptually related to one
another, and the arguments discussed therein intersect in important ways.
a.

The Assertedly Proper Role of the Legal System

This section discusses the role proponents of tort reform believe
should be allocated to the legal system—in essence, that is, why they
believe American courts should hear tort cases at all. It should be altogether
unsurprising that proponents of reform generally advocate an exceedingly
circumspect role for the tort system, and there is little remarkable about this
fact. Nevertheless, the manner in which they justify this understanding is
significant and bears important consequences for the nature of the challenge
they pose to the existing legal order.
First, this section will examine, on a general level, the role that tort
reform advocates have argued that the legal system should perform. Second,
it considers how this understanding—not so much an argument in favor of
tort reform as a logical assumption that undergirds it—is assimilated into the
broader context of the case they make for change. On this level, it will
explore the manner in which it provides a foundation for the panoply of
proactive arguments examined in Section I and the consequences of this
interaction.
b.

The Role of the System

While there is not complete uniformity on this point among
different proponents of tort reform, they can perhaps be seen as embracing

_______________________________________________________
125
Id. at § 5. The scale included in the bill provided that attorneys could collect 40% of the first $50,000
recovered by the claimant, 33.3 % of the next $50,000, 25% of the next $500,000, and 15% of any
amount in excess of $600,000. Id.
126
Id. at § 7. The bill provided as follows: “Punitive damages may, if otherwise permitted by applicable
State or Federal law, be awarded against any person in a health care lawsuit only if it is proven by clear
and convincing evidence that such person acted with malicious intent to injure the claimant, or that such
person deliberately failed to avoid unnecessary injury that such person knew the claimant was
substantially certain to suffer.” Id. The standard would appear to preclude the recovery of punitive
damages in instances of reckless conduct.
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one of two slightly variant paradigms. The first of these is that the system
exists for some limited purpose, most typically to compensate economic loss.
The second assesses no particular role to the legal system whatsoever;
instead, it is either asserted to be a historical creature with indeterminate
purposes or, in the alternative, simply taken for granted as existent, but
unnecessary to explain. In any event, regardless of which of these models a
particular argument accepts as its underpinning, the choice bears very little,
if any, consequence for the manner in which the broader indictment of the
system is thereafter deployed. In either instance the case for tort reform, as
we receive it, is predicated upon the idea that the civil liability system
should have an exceptionally limited role with no broader social or political
end to serve or pursue. This belief, however presented, lies at the core of
the tort reform model.
Tort reform proponents who contend that the system exists to
compensate economic loss or perform some other limited function typically
do so in perfunctory terms, oftentimes by way of brief excursions deeply
embedded within sweeping critiques. For instance, in one of his lengthy
screeds on the tort system, Howard writes:
Lying dormant on along the side of society is another
important legal principle: that a person injured should be
“made whole” by damages. Traditionally, this meant outof-pocket losses, like lost wages or medical bills. In an
unusual case, like a homemaker with no wages, claims were
permitted in categories not actually calculable, like “pain
and suffering.” In cases of genuine evil, punitive damages
were possible. Today the exceptions have engulfed the
rule . . .127
In short, he is suggesting, damages should be available only as
compensation for economic loss; in doing so, he conflates wholeness with
economic wholeness.
In a related vein, former Attorney General Griffin Bell and former
Senator Alan Simpson assert that the role of the law is to define clear duties
that citizens owe to one another, and that in doing so, it should not provide
remedies with respect to controversial social issues. They contend:
What’s missing in American justice today is precisely what
law is supposed to provide — deliberate choices of who can
sue for what. Only when legislatures and judges make these
deliberate choices will people know where they stand. Law
is the foundation of freedom because by providing

_______________________________________________________
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guideposts of right or wrong, it defines the boundaries of
free action and movement. . . . When legal disputes rise to a
level of national importance, such as how to compensate the
victims of asbestos or restoring order to healthcare, it is
precisely the responsibility of Congress to make the
judgments of who can sue for what.128
Similar arguments recur throughout various works advocating tort
retrenchment.129
The arguments reproduced above (and others like them) posit an
exceptionally limited role for the tort system. In each instance, the tort
system, it is contended, should provide resolution to individual disputes.
Howard, for instance, sees little fault with a victim being made whole by the
court, at least so long as the process of doing so only entails compensation
for economic loss.130 A legal system defined on such a basis should, as a
normative matter, have very little, if any, effect on the society more
broadly.131 By this token, he appears to conceive of the legal system as

_______________________________________________________
128
Griffin Bell & Alan Simpson, Civil Justice Problems Undermine Freedom, The Hill (Mar. 2, 2004)
(available at http://www.hillnews.com/news/030204/ss_simpson.aspx (accessed Jan. 1, 2006)).
129
See e.g. Treasury Secretary Addresses American Tort Reform Association’s Annual Meeting, States
News Serv. (Mar. 16, 2004) (quoting Treasury Secretary John Snow as saying, “To make the situation
even less fair, less than 50 cents of each dollar of those tort costs go to victims . . .
and, of that, only 22 cents goes to compensate them for actual economic losses they have suffered . . .
meanwhile the personal injury lawyers profit enormously.” He later added, “The civil justice system was
meant to help people, to ensure fair compensation for injuries and losses. Not to make personal injury
lawyers wealthy.”); see also Editorial, Pennsylvania Tort Song, Wall St. J. A10 (Jan. 17, 2003) (“What
Pennsylvania desperately needs is tort reform that would cap pain-and-suffering awards and put
reasonable limits on contingency fees. California passed such a reform in the late 1970s and that state's
malpractice system has run smoothly ever since. Patients who are genuinely harmed by malpractice still
get their day in court, but the settlements compensate for actual harm and don't drive doctors from the
state.”); Editorial, Bush Challenges Congress on Liability Reform, Wash. Times A18 (Jan. 23, 2003)
(quoting, with approval, President Bush’s contention that, “If [plaintiffs] can prove in court that they
deserve to collect damages, ‘they should be able to recover the cost of their care and recovery and lost
wages and economic losses for the rest of their life.’”).
A paradigmatic example of this contention is available on the American Association for Tort
Reform website. With respect to non-pecuniary damages, it asserts that they “include such things as pain
and suffering, emotional distress and loss of consortium or companionship, which do not involve cash
loss and have, therefore, no precise cash value. It is very difficult for juries to assign a dollar value to
these losses, particularly with the minimal guidance they are normally given. As a result, these awards
tend to be erratic and, because of the highly charged environment of personal injury trials, excessive.” It
proceeds to recommend that “[s]tates should establish dollar limits on recoveries of non-economic loss in
all cases. This is a direct and effective way to address the problem.” See Am. Tort Reform Assn., ATRA
Issues: Noneconomic Damages Reform, http://www.atra.org/show/7340 (accessed Jan. 1, 2006).
On a separate page, the site notes, “On Tuesday November 2, ATRA General Counsel Victor
Schwartz testified before the Senate Committee on The Judiciary about the trend of ‘Regulation through
litigation’. Resisting this trend, and reasserting the prerogative of the legislature to establish public
policy is an ATRA priority.” See Am. Tort Reform Assn., ATRA Issues: Regulation through Litigation,
http://www.atra.org/show/7351 (accessed Jan. 1, 2006).
130
See Howard, supra n. 127.
131
To be sure, one who believes that the primary role of the tort system is to compensate loss may
simultaneously believe that it should deter potentially dangerous conduct. However, what sets Howard’s
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much by what it should not do as what it should: the role of a court is to
bring resolution to a particular, otherwise irreconcilable dispute, and then to
get out of the way.
This conception of the proper role of the system is intended to paint
its defenders into a corner, for virtually any effect a legal judgment might
have extrinsic to the consequences it bears for the individual dispute
adjudicated is deemed to exceed its theoretical mandate. Take for instance,
the analysis advanced in Howard’s book. The predominant portion of its
discussion decries the fact that citizens are, in pursuit of their everyday
activities, stricken with fear of the possibility that they might be sued. His
introductory chapter, for example, laments the fact that people are altering
their conduct to “avoid[ ] legal risk.”132 It is problematic, to his mind, that a
municipality has replaced its “playground equipment with new, safer
alternatives, including transparent tubes to crawl through and a one-person
seesaw that works on a spring.”133 “Can you wait?” he derisively queries,
proceeding to suggest that the new equipment is undesirable because it will
be “boring.”134
This notion that the administrator of a playground would remove
equipment is not, by his understanding, problematic because it over-deters
socially beneficial conduct; rather, it is problematic merely because it deters
people in acting.135 It omits the step of determining whether some measure
of deterrence might, at the end of the day, be beneficial and eschews any
consideration of the importance of the activity in question. In so contending,
his argument ranges far beyond what might be found in, for instance, a law
review article premised upon the assumptions of law and economics.
Instead, he relies on mechanisms wholly divorced from the context of the
legal system to enforce, where necessary, appropriate norms of safe conduct.
As adverted to above, the second prevalent approach adopted by
proponents of tort reform who must, in the course of argument, confront the
role of the legal system is simply to refrain from discussing it at all. Walter
Olson has employed such a rhetorical stratagem in several of his works,

conception of the tort system apart is that he does not appear to embrace such a view. If one is to rely
upon his book to explain his underlying vision of the tort system, it would appear that he seeks only
compensation for its own sake, and little more.
132
Howard, supra n. 127, at 5.
133
Id. at 4.
134
Id. Crier carries her understanding of the legal system as a compensatory mechanism to a similar end.
She writes that “[t]he rule of law was never meant to be a substitute for community standards.” Crier,
supra n. 45, at 2. The point, she suggests, is that there are alternative means for the regulation or
modulation of dangerous conduct, and that the courts were never meant to assert primacy in this sphere.
Id.
135
The case for tort reform thus deviates from the conception of the legal system embraced by law and
economics scholars, who, of course, advocate a regulatory role for the courts so long as it is reduced to
appropriate conceptual boundaries.
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including The Litigation Explosion.136 There, he writes:
America’s common law tradition, like the legal tradition of
every great nation, formerly viewed a lawsuit as an evil, at
best a necessary evil. . . . It was acrimonious, furthering
resentments between people who might otherwise find
occasion to cooperate. It tended to paralyze productive
enterprise and the getting on of life in general by keeping
rights in a state of suspense. . . . [However,] it was
sometimes the least bad of the extremities to which
someone might be reduced; but society could at a minimum
discourage it where it was not absolutely necessary.137
Rather than supplementing the argument contained in this paragraph with a
theoretical excursion into the appropriate proactive role of the legal
system—which would seem to follow logically from his assertion that a
lawsuit was, in some instances, a necessary evil—Olson proceeds to discuss
the various legal devices that, he contends, had historically been
implemented to effectuate this societal ambivalence towards legal remedies.
The reader is never, in his account, informed why the purported evil would
ever be necessary. Thereafter, he discusses what he believes to have been
society’s recent decision to forsake this restrained perspective on the
advisability of litigation. Most tellingly, Olson proceeds to criticize the
prevalent modern theoretical justifications for tort law:
The overthrow of the old barriers began with a simple idea.
Squinted at from a distance, litigation would appear to have
a brighter side. When successful, it brings some benefit . . .
to the instigator . . . . The idea of treating lawsuits as
vessels for “compensation” and “deterrence” is seductive.
In no time at all you get to thinking of them less as a
personal tragedy and more as a policy opportunity.138
These two passages, separated in the book by less than a page, operate to
much the same effect as Howard’s analysis: they restrict the role of the legal
system to the resolution of individual disputes, and assert that any broader
effects it may have are undesirable, not to mention wholly unnecessary.
As a supplemental matter, it bears mention that proponents of tort
reform commonly employ two devices, complementary of one another, that
rhetorically minimize the role of the legal system still further. First, when

_______________________________________________________
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Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion: What Happened When America Unleashed the Lawsuit
(Truman Talley Books-Dutton 1991).
137
Id. at 2-3.
138
Id. at 4.
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they suggest a particular reason for which the tort system exists, they tend
not to develop it with any conceptual depth. Howard and Crier contend that
the legal system ought, at least as a general matter, to compensate plaintiffs
for economic loss. But they do so only by way of assertion, and little more.
This is by no means a logical imperative of the argument they are advancing.
Insomuch as they each endeavor to explain to a general audience why the
legal system must be restricted, an explanation of what it must be restricted
to would scarcely be unnecessary verbiage. In a related vein, neither
devotes so much as minimal effort to explaining why non-pecuniary
damages do not advance the objective of making a plaintiff whole. In fine,
whatever purpose the legal system is assessed in these accounts is divorced
from any theoretical mooring. There is no transcendent principle at stake,
no baby that must be protected when the bathwater is discarded. In failing
to derive or justify a principle that should underlie and animate the legal
system, proponents of tort reform subtly relax the burden of persuasion they
must satisfy. Second, the discussions of the tort system’s proper role are
momentary diversions; little space, if any, is devoted to them. As the
justification is set forth in summary terms in context of a lengthy indictment
of the system, it is minimized perhaps even more rhetorically than it is
logically.139
c.

Patients First and the Role of the Legal System

Throughout the debate on the Patients First Act, the bill’s
proponents advocated a conception of the appropriate role of the legal
system consonant with that urged by supporters of tort reform.140 First, they
contended that the core purpose of tort law was to provide redress for
economic losses suffered as a result of negligence.
While they
acknowledged that non-pecuniary loss should be compensable, they treated
it as a secondary purpose of tort law, and therefore, the permissible subject
of regulation or substantial retrenchment, rather than an entitlement of a
higher order. Second, they contended that whatever compensatory functions
the legal system was intended to serve, it should not serve a broader
deterrent function.
The notion that economic loss is the foundational concern of the tort
system was advocated first by President Bush in his speech to the American
Medical Association.141 There, he stated:

_______________________________________________________
139

Certainly, the terms in which proponents of tort reform discuss the system itself reflects as much a
mindset about the system, manifested in the written discussions, as a deliberate rhetorical stratagem.
However, the primary concern of this article is to understand the manner in which we, as consumers of
ideas, receive the case for tort reform, rather than the motivations of its proponents for their own sake.
140
See 149 Cong. Rec. S9007 (daily ed. July 8, 2003); 149 Cong. Rec. S9013 (daily ed. July 8, 2003);
149 Cong. Rec. S9063 (daily ed. July 9, 2003).
141
Pres. George W. Bush, supra n. 16, at ¶ 31.
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We want our legal system to work for our patients. We
want people to have a day in court. Anyone who is harmed
at the hands of a doctor should have a hearing. That's what
we want for the justice system. They should be able to
recover the full cost of their care and other economic losses.
If harmed by a doc, they ought to be able to recover their
economic costs, economic losses. They should be able to
recover non-economic damages, as well. But for the sake of
the system, noneconomic damages should be capped at
$250,000.142
By this understanding, insomuch as the tort system compensates victims of
medical malpractice for economic loss, it is effectuating a principled
mandate; but where the consideration of non-economic damages is required,
it is permissible, even imperative, to impose regulatory limitations “for the
sake of the system.”143
This conception of the tort system was urged on myriad occasions,
in various forms, throughout the course of the Senate debate. For instance,
while discussing what he contended were the deleterious effects of the legal
system, Senator Michael Enzi stated, “It all comes back to our legal system.
It is simply out of control. People who are truly injured by health care
errors ought to receive fair compensation.”144 Later, he added:
“The statistics show that insurance premiums are lower in
States with such limits, but I have heard Members on the
other side of the aisle argue that the limit in this bill is too
low, that it is unfair to someone who is severely injured,
despite the fact that the bill does not limit in any way that
person's right to recover every cent of the economic
damages that result from that injury.”145

_______________________________________________________
142

Id.
Id.
149 Cong. Rec. at S9063.
145
Id. See also 149 Cong. Rec. at S9013 (“It basically sets sensible limits on the noneconomic damages
that can be obtained in these lawsuits. The noneconomic damages are those damages that go above and
beyond the bills that have to be paid. When you get sick and the physician allegedly committed
malpractice, you had to go to another doctor to get the problem resolved. Those are economic damages
as you lost wages, and any other expenses that you have. And those economic losses are fully
compensated. But above and beyond that, you are entitled and juries will award substantial damages for
noneconomic losses, mostly called pain and suffering because of what you had to go through. Certainly
people recover something for their pain and suffering. The question is how much.”) (statement of Sen.
Ensign); Id. at S9024 (“The fact is, this legislation provides a commonsense approach to our litigation
problems that will help keep consumers from bearing the cost of costly and unnecessary litigation, while
making sure those with legitimate grievances have recourse to the courts. That is what we want to do.
We want to make sure those who are legitimately harmed have recourse to the courts and are
compensated. The bill sets sensible limits on noneconomic damages to help restrain medical liability
143
144
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The animating purpose of providing such a remedy—that is
economic damages, together with some allowance for non-pecuniary loss—
was contended to be the compensation of individual victims, and not
broader regulation of conduct. “[W]e can all agree that a patient should be
compensated fairly,” noted Sen. John Cornyn. 146 Echoed Sen. Mitch
McConnell, “This is a bill that does provide for victims.”147 However, it
was, for supporters of the bill, problematic when the legal climate caused
doctors to alter their conduct in the course of treating patients. Such
decisions on the part of physicians were couched as having been made due
to fear. Sen. Enzi, for example, suggested, “Doctors and hospitals live in
constant fear of litigation. They order unnecessary tests out of legal fear.”148
Neither his position nor his rhetoric admitted of the possibility that, in
certain circumstances, it could be beneficial for the legal system to have
such an effect. Where such external effects of the legal system are set in
terms of fear, their legitimacy is, in all instances, denied. (Additionally, as
discussed below, proponents of the bill proposed that the most efficient way
to improve medical care would be to institute measures that facilitated selfregulation within the profession.)
d.

How this Grounds the Model

The argumentative posture that proponents of tort reform adopt
concerning the theoretical justification for the existence of the legal system
provides the foundation for the broader critique they advance. In confining
the role of the legal system to the resolution of individual disputes and the
provision of economic damages, proponents of tort reform may claim that
any broader affects of lawsuits are inconsonant with that role. If one
adheres to a very narrow view of what the legal system should be doing,
more of what it actually is doing can be characterized as inappropriate. This,
in turn, renders a vast array of consequences the legal system
unquestionably brings about subject to criticism.
More importantly, the actual, practical consequences of legal
decision-making do not thereby merely become subject to criticism; they
also become subject to explanation and definition. Typically, proponents of
tort reform do not argue that the legal system has, for time immemorial,
premium increases, while ensuring unlimited economic compensation for patients injured by
negligence.”) (statement of Sen. Voinovich).
146
Id. at S9016. Interestingly, Sen. Cornyn stated, at the beginning of the same sentence, “When patients
get sick, we all want to prevent medical errors.” Id. However, he continued, “But if you can find some
goal hidden somewhere within the current dysfunctional medical liability system, that goal would not be
either the prevention of errors or the fair compensation for injury.” Id.
147
Id. at S9025.
148
149 Cong. Rec. at S9063. He proceed to read, at length, from Philip K. Howard’s book, The Collapse
of the Common Good. Id.; see also 149 Cong. Rec. at S9007 (“Comprehensive reform is critical on a
national level because every American patient should have access to affordable and high quality health
care. Likewise, every responsible, meritorious member of the health care community should not be
afraid to provide such care because of the fear of litigation.”) (statement of Sen. Ensign).
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exceeded its appropriate role in a democratic society. Howard, for instance,
casts himself as an exponent of the views espoused by Aristotle, Cardozo,
and Justice Lewis Powell, among others.149 To the contrary, they conceive
of themselves as defending society’s traditional conceptualization of the
legal system against encroachments by trial lawyers, legal theorists, and
proponents of sociocultural change. In arguing for what they believe to be
reform, that is, they are calling attention to a putative transition from the old
to the new, and trying to reverse it. By this understanding, the tort system is,
in its present incarnation, historically aberrant, and its present effects are
neither conventional nor preordained.
If this is the case—that is, that our society has deviated from a wellestablished historical understanding of the legal system—then it is necessary
to account for our decision, made either by conscious choice or passive
acquiescence, to do so. This implies two related questions: first, in what
ways have we departed from this historical understanding; and second, who
or what is responsible for these departures? The manner in which
proponents of tort reform take up the questions they impliedly pose for
themselves will be addressed in the next subsection.
3.

Suffusion

As discussed supra, because proponents of tort reform restrict the
appropriate role of the legal system to narrow conceptual confines, they are
able to define the lion’s share of the work the legal system actually does as
inappropriate. Moreover, as noted above, in framing the issue in such a
manner, the question of how we, as a society, came to this juncture is
simultaneously, if impliedly, posed.
Tort reformers capitalize upon this opportunity in a strikingly
uniform manner: they depict the legal system as a vessel into which the
values of particular actors can be poured and proceed to argue that the
activities of the legal system must be understood as suffused with these
values. By this token, the legal system itself is a passive institution. It does
not exert meaningful constraints upon their actions or choices, but merely
provides the occasion for their effectuation. For the sake of clarity, I refer to
this component of the case for tort reform as suffusion. For example, it is
often argued that the apparatus of the legal system has been commandeered
by trial lawyers, whose primary interest is, we are told, the acquisition of
wealth. They proceed, then, to contend that the legal system is merely a
conduit for such unrestrained greed and that the judgments it reaches

_______________________________________________________
149

Howard, supra n. 127, at 61. He indicates that these individuals, unlike his contemporaries,
understood that the value of the law lies in its clarity. Id. Interestingly, he cites them for their negative
views on the legal system—what it should not be doing—but not their positive conceptions of where
courts ought to tread. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol31/iss2/4

2006]

THE ANATOMY OF AN IMAGE

281

(typically in tort cases) must be understood in these terms.
This subsection seeks to understand the manner in which suffusion
functions. It proceeds on two levels. First, it devotes sustained attention to
the manner in which it is deployed. The purpose of this portion of the
discussion is to consider suffusion microcosmically—i.e., how it manifests
itself in specific works or with respect to particular debates. Second, it
adopts a macrocosmic perspective demonstrating how the arguments for tort
reform, analyzed in the first section of this article, should be understood
with reference to suffusion.
a.

An Introduction to Suffusion

Walter Olson’s book, The Litigation Explosion, is as good a place as
any to begin an inquiry into the manner in which suffusion is employed to
portray and explain the operations of the legal system.150 It advances the
fairly conventional view among tort reform proponents that the safeguards
the legal system employs are easily skirted by clever lawyers, and that as a
result, judgments emanating from courts tend to advance little more than the
lawyers’ (taken in concert as a monolithic entity) agenda.151
As noted, it is Olson’s contention that, as a historical matter, the
legal system was confined to an exceedingly narrow scope of operation.152
As such, the law typically, by design, employed bright line rules and
presumptions in order to lend efficient resolution to disputes that arose
between parties.153 However, he contends, in recent years, the law has been
beset by ambiguity, as presumptions have been discarded in lieu of a
sweeping normative understanding of the courts’ proper role.154 As a result
of the purported evolution of the legal system, Olson argues, it became
easier to file lawsuits, since “[w]hen the law takes the form of clear,
comprehensive, objective and preannounced rules, litigation is mostly a
waste of time.” 155 And conversely, of ambiguity is born “let-‘em-sue’
logic,” as the jury, the dispositor of facts, becomes necessary to resolve
disputes that cannot be decided on summary judgment simply as a matter of
law.156
By his understanding, the legal system in accepting ambiguous
standards in the stead of definitive rules became a venue for the
opportunistic plaintiffs’ lawyers. In the introduction of the book, Olson

_______________________________________________________
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Olson, supra n. 137.
Id.
152
Id.
153
Olson, supra n. 137, at 135-139.
154
See id. at 4.
155
Id. at 138.
156
Id. at 104.
151
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summarizes his argument as follows:
Step by step the old procedural barriers to the litigious
instinct had been dismantled. The controls on running
litigation as a no-apologies, profit-making industry soon
came off as well. . . . America’s lawyers began breaking
free of the humdrum role of hired middlemen . . . to become
“players” who thought up the deals, or in this case [sic] the
fights. They began identifying likely grievances and
approaching potential clients with the happy news of their
lucrative right to accuse someone of wrongdoing. . . . As
time went on, many of the increasingly passive clients were
reduced to little more than figureheads, as lawyers found
ways to litigate more or less openly on their own account.157
The remainder of the book is, in significant part, devoted to the development
of this narrative. As is evident from this excerpt, his argument diminishes—
even, at times, renders altogether nugatory—the role of plaintiffs in lawsuits,
depicting them as quiescent accomplices of lawyers, rather than as involved
and interested parties. As a consequence, the natural implication of his
argument is that the primary role of the legal system has become the
satisfaction of lawyers. Put another way, the legal system is run of, by, and
for these attorneys.
Olson’s portrait of lawyers therefore has broad consequences for the
image of the legal system he cultivates. If lawyers conceived of themselves
merely as dedicated public servants seeking social justice, then, while the
system might be effectuating their values, it would at least be necessary for
him to discuss whether these particular values should be our own. However,
Olson believes lawyers to be motivated to act by self-interest, primarily a
desire for enrichment, and it is this value that he believes they inject into the
system itself.158
He traces the origins of the putative litigation explosion to an
increasing tendency on the part of the trial bar to solicit business. In
significant part, Olson lays blame for this development at the feet of the
Supreme Court, which removed what he considers to have been justified
constraints upon the right of attorneys to advertise their services. 159
Additionally, he believes that the norms of conduct within the legal
community became more permissive with respect to the solicitation of
business.160 Due to these developments, “[f]rom every ferryboat sinking to

_______________________________________________________
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Id. at 5.
Id.
159
Id. at 22.
160
Id. at 23-24.
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mine cave-ins, every disaster around the country and indeed the world
seemed to be followed within hours by a raven-like descent of American tort
lawyers boldly stalking the airport lounges and hotel lobbies where flown-in
relatives waited for news of survivors.”161 Quite evidently, he considers the
typical lawsuit to be lawyer generated, rather than the product of a decision
on the part of the would-be plaintiff to seek legal recourse for some alleged
wrong he or she has suffered.
Moreover, Olson contends, the economics of the legal system
encourage lawyers to seek profit by volume, rather than merit. 162 He
suggests that this is the case because of the contingency-fee structure upon
which most tort lawyers operate.163 First, if a lawyer has a financial stake in
the outcome of litigation, he is likely to pursue the matter to satisfy his own
interest in obtaining the greatest recovery possible. 164 Second, with the
adoption of the contingency fee, it befit lawyers to solicit as much business
as possible, ostensibly without significant regard for the merits of the suit in
question.165
Due to this fee structure, which, he surmises, provides the lawyer a
financial incentive to pursue the matter to as lucrative a resolution as
possible, the litigation process becomes more adversarial.166 The lawyer’s
involvement diminishes, even eliminates, the possibility of a settlement that
incorporates significant non-pecuniary terms.167 For example, he suggests, a
libel suit cannot, once a lawyer has insinuated himself into the settlement
process, be resolved by allowing the plaintiff the opportunity to have the
publication print his “side of the story.”168 Addressing the potential plaintiff,
Olson solemnly cautions, “[T]he action is no longer yours alone. You have
a new partner in your lawsuit . . . to whom words of forgiveness butter no
parsnips and gestures of mercy pay for no beachfront condos. You may be
pushed towards high-ticket strategies, though they end in hatred and selfreproach.” 169 The plain upshot of Olson’s argument is that the litigation
process is a mechanism for the fulfillment of the lawyer’s financial interest.
The lawsuits that result from the lawyer’s desire to satiate his thirst for

_______________________________________________________
161

Id. at 24.
See id. at 32-50.
163
Id.
164
See e.g. id. at 39 (noting that, with the legalization of contingency fees, the system “was asked to run
on a new kind of altruism, the self-restraint of lawyers with fortunes at stake”).
165
See id. at 39-40. Olson cites, with approval, a quotation by a 1920’s federal prosecutor to the effect
that contingency fees were the “‘arch tempter to the ambulance chaser’ (as well as the fount of ‘false
claims, witness fixing, and perjury’).” Id. at 39. He further notes that it provided an “incentive to go for
volume, volume, and more volume.” Id.
166
Id. at 40-45.
167
Id. at 41.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 42.
162
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money—and we are led to believe that this category encompasses much of
the litigation that actually takes place—serve no broader social benefit or
end. Lawsuits are about money, and nothing more.
Having suggested that legal claims by plaintiffs are little more than
vehicles for financial gain, Olson sets about explaining why the courts are
ill-equipped to stem the tide of such suits once they have been allowed to
progress past the summary judgment phase. 170 First, as noted above, he
argues that the increasing prevalence of ambiguous legal rules allows
lawyers the latitude they require to spin claims of straw into gold.171 At
various points in the process lawyers can: (1) craft “cunningly phrased”
pleadings;172 (2) “change the subject; to play on emotion, prejudice, and awe
of the fine-sounding; to sow doubt where there should be certainty, or the
reverse;” 173 (3) create a sense of drama at trial, as by inviting large
audiences, in order to create the impression among jurors that a large verdict
is warranted;174 (4) find “hired gun” experts;175 and (5) find ways to create,
extend, or exploit causes of action.176 In short, the lawyers adeptly use the
system in pursuit of their ends.
It follows naturally from this understanding of the functioning of the
legal process that judgments are mere embodiments of the ideals that caused
the suits to be filed in the first instance. Olson opines, “One thinks of trials
as places where right and wrong are decided, but nowadays blame is often a
side issue and the grand-scale fighting goes on over the damages figures.”177
The damage award bears no direct correlation to the blameworthiness of the
defendant’s conduct, the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or even
the economic value of the activity at issue. It is merely a product of the trial
lawyer’s financial speculation, devised without any evident rhyme, reason,
or conceptual core. There is no distinction drawn between the lawyers, their
motivations, and the results of the system; the courts are a mere implement

_______________________________________________________
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Id.
Id.
172
Id. at 91.
173
Id. at 153.
174
Id. at 161.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 170.
177
Id. at 171. Elsewhere, sounding a similar note, Olson writes:
With the twin weaponry of RICO and punitive damages, America’s trial lawyers
have set themselves up as ‘private attorneys general’ of a uniquely privileged kind.
They can charge opponents with shocking-sounding wrongdoing under the vague,
shifting, and retroactive legal standards that typify life after the triumph of Legal
Realism. They can build cases on a scaffolding of the merest guesswork and
supposition, junk science, and prejudicial tidbits. . . . They can bring a long line of
plaintiffs to court to challenge the same underlying act of a defendant, and if ten
juries find no guilt they can call on an eleventh. At the end of it all they can
pocket for themselves and their clients fines of a magnitude with not much limit
outside the indignant imagination. Id. at 289.
171
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wielded in their endeavor.
The method by which Olson frames his indictment of the legal
system is, as indicated above, fairly common in the works of tort reform
proponents. For his part, Philip K. Howard does not appear to share Olson’s
belief that lawyers are chiefly responsible for the socially deleterious
changes to our legal culture. Nevertheless, he likewise deploys suffusion to
press his point as to why reform of the courts is necessary. As noted above,
Howard contends that the legal system should set down clearly defined
duties to apprise society of the appropriate bounds of conduct and bring
resolution to disputes, but that it should rarely, if ever, bring about broader
social consequences.178
In The Lost Art of Drawing the Line, Howard argues that our society
has embarked upon a “quest to achieve individual fairness through
neutrality,” and that as a result, have “lost the ability to distinguish between
what’s reasonable and what’s not.”179 Elaborating upon this suggestion, he
argues that Americans as a society give rights an “almost theological
power.”180 Consequently, judgments emanating from courts of law acquire
a legitimacy to which he believes they are not entitled. “Fairness is
guaranteed, whatever the result, we believe, because each party to the
dispute had an equal right to make his arguments.”181
For Howard, the legal system is suffused with “[o]ur modern
consciousness” and its attendant obsession with individual rights.182 While
it is problematic for him that society seems to assess talismanic importance
to individual rights, he is especially concerned with people who make what
appear to be unreasonable decisions based on that perspective. Howard
notes:
A young couple in our neighborhood . . . visited his parents
on New Year’s Eve. The sidewalk was icy [and] she
slipped and broke her ankle. Her response came out of the
new American playbook: She sued his parents. The goal
was not to recover medical costs. . . . The idea was to go
after a windfall from the parents’ insurance company. . . .
She got a huge settlement from suing his parents. Now
that’s certainly ingenious. But isn’t insurance supposed to
be for real lawsuits? Doesn’t that attitude just raise the
costs of everyone else’s insurance? Never mind. Accidents

_______________________________________________________
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are almost assumed to be an occasion to make money. You
almost feel like a chump if you don’t at least threaten to
sue.183
While this could appear to narrow his attack, in fact, it broadens it. He
conflates his criticism of society for its acceptance of the individual rights
paradigm with what he posits to be an exemplar of that model taken to its
logical extreme.184 As a matter of argumentation, this essentially obviates
the need for him to discuss cases that sound, as an intuitive matter, to be
more severe—virtually all cases are cut of the same cloth and can be
conceptually grouped with one another. 185 Though he presents the point
with less emphasis, Howard, like Olson, considers most legal claims to
originate in a desire for monetary compensation. “Courts are not supposed
to be commercial establishments where, for the price of a lawyer, anyone
can buy a chance at a raffle,” he contends.186 This is ultimately especially
problematic because “[t]he standard operating procedure for any aspiring
litigant is to sue to the moon,” and as such, it is “easy to threaten the
adversary’s entire livelihood.”187
Though Howard’s argument differs in its details from that advanced
by Olson’s, it likewise represents a use of suffusion as a rhetorical tact. The
legal system is shot through with the selfish opportunism of tenuous
individual rights claims for monetary damages; lawsuits are vehicles for the
vindication of these principles. 188 Howard further argues that the courts
pose no reliable bulwark against the tide of baseless, or at the least, harmful,
lawsuits.189 He asserts that “legal principles are just words” and that, as a
result, “[a]s often as not, the law is turned upside down.”190 In a manner
similar to Olson, he locates the purported impotence of legal institutions in
the nature of the law itself. Again, no line is drawn between the problem—
an obsession with individual rights—and the courts; the legal system is
merely a venue for the effectuation of the paradigm.
At this point, several general observations about the argumentative
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implications of suffusion, as a rhetorical device, may be warranted.191 First,
as noted above, by employing this tactic, tort reform proponents deftly
enable themselves to cast frivolous or counterintuitive lawsuits as typical
ones. Most significantly, this is due to the fact that suffusion defines the
system by the extrapolation of a particular set of values across the broad
spectrum of the docket. Olson, for instance, repeatedly asserts that the tort
system is, in actuality, a vehicle for the fulfillment of the objectives of trial
lawyers.192 He complements this account with anecdotes that, he contends,
illustrate his point. For instance, he begins his tenth chapter by recounting a
story of a lawsuit in which a retailer that developed film was held liable for
failing to process a particular roll successfully, notwithstanding the fact that
the customer had received a disclaimer that should have covered such a
situation.193 He proceeds to contend that the tort system is steadily eroding
the importance of contractual provisions, insinuating that the prefatory
anecdote is, in actuality, the norm as to how disclaimers are treated.194 In
employing suffusion, proponents of tort reform define the system with
reference to the outer boundary of what happens in the tort system and then

_______________________________________________________
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For three other specific examples of suffusion, see Crier, supra n. 45; Patrick M. Garry, A Nation of
Adversaries: How the Litigation Explosion is Reshaping America (Plenum Press 1997); Center for Legal
Policy at the Manhattan Institute, Trial Lawyers Inc.: A Report on the Lawsuit Industry in America 2003
(2003) (available at http://www.triallawyersinc.com; select TLI Original Report, click on Downlaod PDF
(3.4mb)) [hereinafter Trial Lawyers Inc.].
Crier suggests that lawyers and plaintiffs cooperate in utilizing the legal system. In her
introduction, for instance, she assesses responsibility to plaintiffs, writing “Litigation is no longer a
crapshoot, [sic] it is becoming a sure thing. If you can’t get a satisfactory nuisance settlement, then try
your case; the awards are phenomenal!” Crier, supra n. 45, at 9. Her primary concern, however, is
lawyers—hence the title of her book, “The Case Against Lawyers.” Crier, supra n. 45.
Garry’s argument operates to similar effect, albeit with a greater emphasis on the actions of
plaintiffs than Crier and Olson. He contends that litigation is the “new frontier,” and “promises wealth to
its successful pioneers, just as the gold fields of California once did.” Garry, supra n. 191, at 2-3. He
continues, “Personal injury claims offer anyone with an ability to voice believable complaints about pain
and suffering the opportunity to collect a quick settlement.” Id. at 3. He believes that most people
consider the decision to enter into legal proceedings to be purely economic in nature, “like investing in a
high-risk business venture or gambling on a bet.” Id. at 27. By Garry’s argument, lawsuits are thus
imbued with the economic character that creates them.
The last example referenced, Trial Lawyers Inc., is a mock “annual report” for the “lawsuit
industry” published by the Manhattan Institute.
It is tied in to a related website.
See
http://www.triallawyersinc.com. The thirty page pamphlet adopts a lawyer-centered model of the legal
system, asserting that “[m]ore and more, the industry resembles a racket designed to do little more than
advance the incomes and interests of its members – everyone else be damned.” Trial Lawyers Inc., supra
n. 191, at 5. It proceeds to discuss a laundry list of areas in which the “industry” operates, including:
“mature product lines” (class actions, asbestos, and medical malpractice); “high-growth products” (mold,
regulated industries); and “new product development” (fast food). See id. at 8-19. In its conclusion,
entitled “Is Reform Possible,” the pamphlet asks, “Will the public come to acknowledge the threat posed
by the litigation industry’s size, influence, and lack of transparency? Will policymakers and judges have
the foresight and will to act in the public interest?” Id. at 24. It concludes, “One thing is certain: our
nation’s future economic health depends on affirmative answers to these questions – on Americans
standing up to the rapacious behemoth that is Trial Lawyers, Inc.” Id.
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work their way inward. The typical case, then, the one with respect to
which rules should be devised, is the frivolous case, not the meritorious one.
Second, suffusion is an actor centric critique; by its very terms, it
identifies culprits and assesses blame. In doing so, it posits a dynamic of
us—that is, society—against them, whoever they might be. Olson, for
instance, suggests that lawyers are employing the system to their own ends,
and that, in doing so, they are imposing harms on the broader society.
Howard, for his part, makes a similar suggestion with regard to people who,
he believes fetishize individual rights. In either instance, the upshot of the
argument is that there are particular actors taking actions to the detriment of
the community. Put another way, the consequences of the legal system are
done to society by certain people.
b.

Patients First and Suffusion

In the Senate debate regarding the Patients First Act, its proponents
consistently characterized the health care system as having been placed in a
state of crisis by the courts.195 In explaining the causes of this crisis, they
portrayed the legal system as deluged with frivolous claims and indicated
that it was such meritless lawsuits that dictated the necessity for reform.196
For some of the speakers, the apparent proliferation of baseless actions was
taken for granted, and no impetus for the development was isolated or
suggested. The pregnant implication was that both lawyers and plaintiffs,
both of whom were necessary to file a frivolous lawsuit, were to blame.
However, that notwithstanding, both plaintiff and trial lawyers were
assessed primary responsibility on some occasions. As for the latter,
Senator Orin Hatch proclaimed their culpability most prominently, stating,
“In all honesty, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out what the
problem is. I hate to say it, being a lawyer and having been a trial lawyer.
The problem is caused by many in our profession who are bringing these
frivolous suits.”197 Plaintiffs, for their part, were identified by Sen. Ensign
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See e.g. 149 Cong. Rec. at S9070.
Id. (“The cause, quite frankly, is the unrestrained plaintiffs’ legal actions asserting all kinds of . . .
damages.”) (statement of Sen. Bond); Id. at S9072 (“[D]octors could no longer afford the premiums
because of the frivolous and outrageous lawsuits that are destroying the court system.”) (statement of Sen.
Ensign); Id. at S9073 (“[We] have an obligation to address the explosion in litigation across the county
and jackpot-sized awards.”) (statement of Sen. Santorum); Id. at S9074 (“We can vote with some trial
lawyers who file endless lawsuits . . .”) (statement of Sen. Dole); 149 Cong. Rec. at S9012 (“[W]e can
actually adopt some legislation to deal with this crisis of lawsuit abuse.”) (statement of Sen. Kyl); Id. at
S9017 (“I believe we should end the liability lottery, where select patients and some trial lawyers receive
astronomical awards.”) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
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149 Cong. Rec. at S9033. See also e.g. 149 Con. Rec. at S9074 (Sen. Dole); 149 Cong. Rec. at S9017
(Sen. Cornyn). President Bush, for his part, was more explicit in laying blame at the feet of the trial
lawyers. He stated, “[T]he legal system looks more and more like a lottery. And with the trial lawyers
[earning] as much as 40 percent of the awards and settlements, it’s pretty clear who is holding the
winning ticket.” Pres. George W. Bush, supra n. 16, at ¶ 32.
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as emblematic of a “litigious society” in which people had become unduly
“sue happy.”198
The evident emphasis in the debate on the need to stem the tide of
frivolous lawsuits, whatever their root cause, is especially notable. By its
terms, the bill was not directly focused on baseless claims, instead
contemplating a strict cap in the amount of $250,000 on awards of nonpecuniary damages in all actions, together with similarly categorical limits
on attorney’s fees.199 If one takes the arguments advanced by proponents of
the bill at face value, then, it must be inferred that they understood such
suits to be the basis on which rules should be crafted—that is, the typical
case. Otherwise, the proposed measure would result in a marked
incongruity between the means pursued and the ends achieved.
The rhetoric employed on the Senate floor supports this
interpretation. Indeed, on numerous instances, advocates of the act argued
that the apparent harmful effects of the legal system were the result of
frivolous claims. Sen. Voinovich asserted:
And when the quality is not there, when people die or are
truly sick due to negligence or other medical error, they
should be compensated. But when healthy plaintiffs file
meaningless lawsuits to coerce settlements or to shake the
money tree to get as much as they can get, there's a
snowball effect and all of us pay the price.200
Similarly, Sen. Ensign contended:
Why are insurers raising rates or leaving the market?
Because there is no stability in the marketplace for
providing medical liability insurance. Why is that the case?
Because our health care system is being overrun by
frivolous lawsuits and outrageous jury awards. This
excessive litigation is leading to higher health care costs to
every American and an unstable peace of mind for our
health care providers.201
In short, the act was, by his argument, justified by the need to address the
problem posed by frivolous suits.
Plainly, the rhetoric deployed in favor of the act makes use of
suffusion. The legal system is treated as a passive institution, “overrun,” in
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the words of Sen. Ensign, by a virtually inexorable wave of meritless suits,
many of which are ultimately, though undeservedly, rewarded by juries.202
In imposing strict limits on the power of the legal system to grant relief, the
act represents an attempt by Congress to save the courts from themselves.
The apparent point is that, while the legislation does not directly preclude
such suits from succeeding, it does limit the broader damage they can do to
society.
c.

Analyzing its Contours and Implications

While the arguments discussed in the first section of this article are
quite frequently presented as disparate contentions, rather than as part and
parcel of coherent critiques of the system such as those advanced by Olson
and Howard, we nevertheless receive and consume them, on the whole, as a
grand instance of suffusion. In essence, the rhetoric of suffusion is
replicated on the comprehensive scale. The arguments concerning lawyers
and the tort system are best understood as operating within the
argumentative infrastructure provided by suffusion.
In the first section of this article, I noted that one of the most
prominent lines of criticism concerning the tort system is that directed at
lawyers. As noted, tort reformers advance an unflattering portrait of lawyers
that emphasizes certain characteristics that members of the profession have
in common. Professor Galanter notes that, prominent among these
characteristics, is that attorneys are “fomenters of strife” and “economic
predators.” 203 Moreover, as observed supra, the trial bar is cast as a
monolithic entity, its ranks united in pursuit of a common goal, the endeavor
unmarred by internal dissent.204 The portrayal of trial lawyers so prevalent
in the public debate concerning the tort system accentuates their ability to
create lawsuits that would not otherwise have been filed. They, as Professor
Galanter notes, are said to be capable of sowing discord and strife within
communities and inducing plaintiffs to file suits.205 This set of arguments
tends to emphasize the power of trial lawyers over the machinery of the
legal system. They are able to sway juries with silver-tongued ease,206 press
potential plaintiffs into service as their clients,207 and, at times, even thwart
legislative efforts at systemic reform. 208 The legal system is, by the
substance and tenor of these arguments, a mere passive instrument utilized
by lawyers (and lawyers alone).
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The most common portrayals of plaintiffs complement this
perception of lawyers. Oftentimes, proponents of tort reform assess
plaintiffs a predominantly passive role—that is, as the lawyer’s
accomplice.209 But more frequently, the potential plaintiff is cast a proactive
participant in the process of filing a lawsuit. He is either unwilling to accept
personal responsibility for his actions or willing to file suit without having
sustained a serious injury. 210 In either event, the plaintiff is, by this
reckoning, an eager participant in the endeavor. And he is moved to do so,
quite often, by a particular, perhaps perverse, moral paradigm. Commonly,
it is contended, the plaintiff elects to initiate a lawsuit due to nothing more
than a desire to derive financial benefit from doing so.211 The rhetoric of
personal responsibility—i.e., the failure to accept it—engrafts a principle (of
sorts) upon the decision to initiate a cause of action. While the plaintiff
seeks a financial recovery, he is doing so because he believes, earnestly it
seems, that the accident or event in question was not his own fault. More
frequently, though, the plaintiff is, like the stereotypical ambulance chasing
lawyer, merely hoping to benefit financially from a dubious injury he has
suffered.
These arguments concerning plaintiffs lend greater potency to the
indictment of the legal system. In attributing to plaintiffs an independent
motivation, the explanation for the excesses of the legal system is deepened;
both participants in the filing of the suit are, for their own reasons,
responsible and, by that token, exert a pernicious influence on society.
Moreover, it introduces a different failing of values into the critique, for
rather than a moral shortcoming on the part of a professional community, it
is one of ordinary members of society. For the most part, these arguments
congeal to form a bleak picture as to why lawsuits are filed. Cases are
brought about predominantly by greed and, otherwise, by a desire to place
blame where it is not deserved.
These arguments concerning the morally dubious motivations of
plaintiffs and lawyers operate alongside the most prevalent critical points
about the legal system. Primarily, the arguments about the legal system go
towards establishing its pliability. Much of the weight of this argument is
directed at juries,212 which, it is posited, are thoroughly unreliable and easily
misled. Implicit in the contention that attorneys can manipulate emotion is
the notion that jurors are susceptible to such tactics. The law, as a network
of rules, is portrayed as exceptionally permissive.213 In fact, as noted supra,
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the legal system is portrayed as an institution that translates counterintuitive
claims into meritorious ones; 214 in essence, it provides the opportunity to
spin straw into gold. One rarely hears of instances in which an applicable
legal rule operated to require the dismissal of a frivolous claim.
In fact, within the rhetorical context of tort reform, one hears little
regarding the law, as an institution, at all. It is, to be sure, utilized, but it
appears to lack any undergirding values or objectives of its own. The
popular contention that the legal system is a litigation lottery215 plays into
this contention, at least in an indirect way. Insofar as, it is alleged, the
system does not mete out reliable judgments, the notion that courts can be
entrusted with a meaningful regulatory role is undermined.
More
importantly, as noted, the metaphor embodies the purported
commodification of legal claims.216
In this sense, the entirety of the actions of the legal system is
defined by the uses to which it is put by lawyers and plaintiffs. These
arguments respecting the legal system interact with one another to create a
sense that it is suffused with the values of greedy lawyers and morally
agnostic plaintiffs. The legal system, it is made to appear, is not moored in
any cogent set of worthy principles, nor, it seems, even employed to
productive end. It merely exists and is used, and insofar as this is the case, it
is merely a weapon in the hands of actors who ought not to be trusted.
To the extent that this is the case, the judgments that are produced
by the legal system are, taken in concert, simply embodiments of the
motivations of the actors who have chosen to avail themselves of its
machinery. As the litigation explosion is the conceptual aggregation of
these lawsuits,217 two essential things may be said of it. First, it is caused by,
and therefore, reflects, the motivations of trial lawyers and their clients.
This includes, most pervasively, a naked desire for profit, but also embraces
a failure to assume personal responsibility for actions. It is, thus considered,
caused by motivations at odds with proper social norms and the traditional
role of the legal system. Second, if it is caused by certain people, it is
enabled by the permissive legal framework American courts have come to
embrace.218
This casts the argument for tort reform in an important light: it is a
means through to limit the power of certain ill-intentioned actors to see their
plans to fruition. In this sense, it is not framed, in an immediate way, as
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taking power from the courts to grant judgments.
4.

The Role of Individual Choice and the Disempowerment
Critique

The previous subsection discussed the infrastructure of the case for
tort reform, arguing that it is, in essence, an actor-centered model that casts
the legal system as having been commandeered by lawyers and plaintiffs in
pursuit of their own ends. It suggested that, as a result, the actions of the
legal systems are seen within this conceptual framework and that this
understanding of the forces animating the system operates to define it. In
this subsection, I discuss the effects that tort reformers argue flow from this
apparent state of the legal system.
In summary, this section will argue that tort reformers conceive of
the legal system, in its present form, as an instrument of societal
disempowerment. This claim on their part has two dimensions—one
explicit, the other implied. Most directly, the argument that the tort system
disempowers society concentrates on the effects of decisions delivered in
the legal context for individuals, companies, and social institutions. But
impliedly, the contention relies, perhaps with equal force, on the assumption
that society has alternative vehicles at its disposal through which individuals
express and effectuate choices and resolve disputes that might arise. Put
another way, any claim that the legal system disempowers society is, in
significant part, predicated upon the presumption that in its operation it
supersedes an alternative, more desirable, apparatus.
This section proceeds on two overarching levels. First, it examines
the disempowerment aspect of the generalized case for tort reform,
comprising both an empirical survey and a consideration of its discursive
dimensions. It starts by considering the underlying aspirational portrait tort
reformers paint of society, and then turns to examine how they believe the
courts cause us to depart from that ideal. Second, it applies what insights
might be gleaned from this general discussion to the specific context of the
recent malpractice liability debate.
a.

How Tort Reformers Believe Society Should (and would)
Make Decisions

The conviction held by tort reformers that society has institutions
for the expression of choice and resolution of grievances that are preferable
to courts is perhaps a necessary corollary to their understanding of the
appropriate role of the legal system itself.219 If one believes that the legal
system has little role to play in regulation of societal conduct or expression
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of social values, there must then be some alternative conduit through which
such preferences may be expressed.
The case for tort reform rests on the notion that, for a variety of
reasons, resort to the court system should ordinarily be unnecessary, even
when an injury is suffered. In a significant sense, the criticisms directed at
plaintiffs who elect to file lawsuits may be seen as operating within this
framework. The underlying assumption of this line of arguments is that not
all people who suffer injuries should consider filing lawsuits, in light of
important aspects of American cultural identity. As discussed in the first
portion of this article, plaintiffs are often subjected to two overarching lines
of attack: first, that they fail to take personal responsibility for their actions;
and second, that they are motivated by greed to file frivolous lawsuits.220
The most direct effect of this portrayal of plaintiffs is to advance the notion
that the lawsuits coursing through the legal system at any particular time are
suffused with these values. But in impugning the character of those who file
lawsuits, proponents of tort reform are concomitantly positing how we, as a
society, should be.
This proactively normative dimension of the critique of plaintiffs is
manifest, to offer an example, in Crier’s version of the point:
The omnipotence of the rule of law has altered our very
mind-set. The image of ourselves that we export, that of the
frontier-minded, self-reliant, and free-spirited American, is
all show. . . . Our psyches are so fragile; the mere mention
of pain and anguish brings tears to the collective eye and
dollar signs to the mind of the attending attorney. . . . Do
you really prefer a padded room to the open range? . . . We
must understand the false exchange as we seek more
protection from unpredictable or dangerous behavior.221
By its terms, Crier’s passage describes a societal change that already has
taken place. However, this focus on its part is semantic, and in any event,
unimportant (for one doubts that her book is directed at those who would
knowingly and unflinchingly file a frivolous lawsuit). She presents a vision
of how society should react to difficult circumstances or challenges: by
bravely pressing forward, even in the face of pain, and accepting that life
necessarily entails risk. 222 Her argument invokes the American as
frontiersman trope and deploys it to a normative end—that is, to the extent
that we are not that way at this stage in our national history, we certainly
should be. By this token, we are degraded by our tendency to rely on the
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220

Supra § II(B)(1)-(2).
Crier, supra n. 45, at 21.
222
Id.
221

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol31/iss2/4

2006]

THE ANATOMY OF AN IMAGE

295

courts when we suffer injuries, for in most cases, we should conceive of
ourselves as victims who require remuneration for a loss.223
An additional point, made alongside the notion that certain types of
physical harm do not merit legal action, is that the ethos of personal
responsibility demands otherwise. Consider, on this score, the discussion of
this point advanced by Professor Cook taken up above.224 At the conclusion
of an article advocating, in essence, the substantial abolition of the tort
system, he suggests, “Eventually society may progress in a direction where
the first words uttered after an auto accident or other injury are ‘Can I help?’
rather than ‘Can I sue?’”225 Like Crier, he deploys the rhetoric of personal
responsibility both as a criticism of those who would file lawsuits and as a
positivist articulation of how people ought to deal with certain situations.226
A further point about appropriate social norms is posed by this brief
sentence of Cook’s article: that the typical plaintiff is unduly adversarial in
his outlook on the world and that, conversely, a society with an appropriate
understanding of the importance of community will settle grievances
voluntarily.227 In his book, A Nation of Adversaries, Patrick Garry takes up
this point at length, arguing, as the volume’s title indicates, that we are
becoming a “society of adversaries.”228 He contends that “[a]n adversarial
culture, bred by the values and lessons of the litigation explosion, is taking
hold in the United States. It is a culture that pushes individuals to conflict
and confrontation, and to continually challenge community authority and
institutions.”229 And, he asserts, this mindset has replaced the preferable one
that came before it, an “assimilation model” in which “society was seen as a
collection of cooperating individuals who sacrificed their differences for the
sake of social cohesion.”230
The foregoing three points pertain to how individuals should behave
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when they suffer harm. As discussed more fully below, taken in concert,
their general implication is that we, as a society, are diminished by reliance
on the court system. This aspect of the tort reform critique posits that
society is changing as resort to the legal system becomes more acceptable.
In this sense, we are culturally disempowered by the courts, as we are made
less self-reliant, less willing to assume responsibility for our own actions,
and less able to cooperate for the common good. In short, we are made
weaker.
More broadly, tort reformers further posit that society has at its
disposal avenues through which decisions should be made. These avenues
may be classified on two separate levels: individual and societal. On the
individual level, proponents of tort reform place great importance on the
value of personal choice. In this sense, the case for tort reform takes on
something of a libertarian dimension—as individuals we should have the
freedom to make most choices for ourselves, rather than having them
dictated to us by some external authority. The tort reform literature tends to
give credence to the notion that individuals are eminently capable of
assessing risks without the guidance or interference of the tort system. For
instance, Howard believes that the “air in America is so thick with legal risk
that you can practically cut it and put it on a scale,”231 but that it need not be
so. He asserts:
In ordinary social interaction, there is no legal duty to
others. People are allowed to be rude, children are expected
to be unreasonable. Citizens of a free society have to learn
to deal with it. . . . Otherwise, we infect ordinary
encounters with legal fear.232
The upshot of this suggestion on his part is that individuals are capable of
choosing whether they want to come into contact with others and to assume
the risk of harm in doing so. In purporting to dictate a comprehensive
network of rules that apply to these encounters, the legal system places
irredeemable burdens on our ability to make these determinations by our
own agency. For his part, Howard opines, “For years, litigation anxiety has
been casting a darker cloud over ordinary choices.”233
In making these individual choices, the argument follows, we are
not left adrift in a sea of potential choices without a compass. To the
contrary, we merely must abide by our notions of common sense and defer
to expert judgments when appropriate. Howard posits, “This is the secret to
freedom. Each person must be able to freely choose, equal to the scope of
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his responsibility, or else all lose their authority to act on their beliefs.”234
Most significantly, this evidently essential freedom to make choices extends
to professionals acting within the scope of their expertise. In a speech,
Senator Zell Miller argued, with evident regret, “Doctors . . . teachers . . .
ministers . . . even Little League coaches find their daily decisions
hamstrung by fear of lawsuits on practically everything.”235
The most popular incarnation of this argument pertains to doctors,
who, tort reformers contend, must be entrusted with the freedom to make
essential medical decisions free from the pervasive fear engendered by the
prevalence of lawsuits. In advocating tort retrenchment on the op-ed page
of the New York Daily News, Richard Schwartz argued that such reform
would “relieve obstetricians and all doctors of enormous stress and let them
make decisions in the best interests of patients . . . . It would allow doctors
to do what they think is right.”236 The argument is not, of course, confined
to doctors. Among other professions, it is also advanced with respect to
teachers who, it follows, must be afforded latitude to enforce discipline in
their classrooms. Argues Howard, “[The lawsuit culture] diverts teachers
from doing what they do best, which is to be themselves and focus on the
children.”237
The underpinning idea of this line of argumentation is that
individuals are capable of making important decisions and that they must be
afforded the freedom to do so. A society that does not resort to litigation, by
this token, comfortably entrusts decisions to the realm of discretion that can
be exercised by experts. It is not ordinarily appropriate to evaluate these
judgments retrospectively, lest their willingness to make difficult, but
necessary, choices be impeded. 238 This contention elevates deference to
knowledge to the level of a social norm. Doctors, it could be said, are best
capable of making medical determinations, and rules propounded by the
legal system ought not intrude upon that province.
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Proponents of tort reform complement their arguments regarding the
value of individual choice by contending that democratic institutions are
well-equipped to allow and implement the expression of the collective will.
In essence, they posit, decisions that take on the character of policy
determinations should be resolved by elected leaders, who act pursuant to
popular mandate. In The Rule of Lawyers, Walter Olson concludes with a
paean to the value of democracy, writing:
The new rule of lawyers brings us many evils, but perhaps
the greatest is the way it robs the American people of the
right to find its own future and pursue its own destiny. No
doubt democratic processes often fall far short of
perfection . . . . But however uncertain the results of
democracy . . . we can feel quite sure that it is a better
course than agreeing to turn over our rights of selfgovernment to a new class of unaccountable lawyers.239
By this token, democratic institutions facilitate the paramount expression of
individual choice. As such, this argument complements, rather than
jettisons, the libertarian character of the contention about the merit of
individual freedom; it posits that individual freedom implies the right to
choose who will have express or implied authority over one’s actions. In
pressing lawsuits with policy implications, such as those that have been filed
against tobacco companies and gun makers, and in pursuing claims that
have broad implications because of the magnitude of damage awards
involved, lawyers, it is suggested, usurp the role of political institutions.
Crier remarks, “[L]awyers have succeeded in expanding control over our
lives in the most extraordinary way.”240
i.

Implications

The underlying normative element of the case for tort reform has
gone unnoticed by a number of astute commentators who have sought to
address the claims that it comprises. This shortcoming is a natural and
understandable consequence of the fact that, when addressing the case for
tort reform, most observers have devoted the majority of their attention to
the direct refutation of erroneous empirical claims. However, in the
interstices of these empirical claims, inaccurate though they might be, lies a
set of prescriptive contentions about societal institutions and interactions.
Proponents of tort reform seek to define, for the consumers of their literature,
both the legal system and its purported alternatives. In this sense, they
present the two as diametrically opposed. One might illustrate the broad
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contours of the argument thusly:
Lawyers/Plaintiffs Æ Tort system
We (i.e., society) Æ Choices (some of which are individual, others
of which are societal)
In plain terms, tort reformers contend that there are two competing sets of
institutions at work. On one level, lawyers and plaintiffs use the tort system
to pursue their own, primarily monetary, motivations. On the other level,
individuals make choices with reference to shared social values and then
implement these decisions within the complementary frameworks of
democracy, community and the marketplace.
This mirror image aspect of the case for tort reform is especially
significant because it essentially defines the terms of the debate it is
intended to establish. In essence, it expresses what is purportedly at stake,
what society has to lose by acquiescing in the evident effect lawyers exert
on everyday life. As a result, tort reform arguments are, at their core, rooted
in a purported desire to protect the power of individual choice. The
commonly made argument that tort costs drive up prices is, in actuality,
rooted in the notion that such decisions should, as a normative matter, be left
to the discretion of the market. It is for this reason that empirical refutation
of claims made by proponents of tort reform may ultimately be beside the
point. The tort reform literature seeks to address itself not merely to
impugning the credibility of the legal system, but to suggesting its natural
alternatives.
ii.

The Decisions We are Apparently No Longer Able to Make

As noted supra, tort reform literature suggests that the legal system
imposes overwhelming costs on society, both in terms of crushing damages
and the fear of incurring them.241 What is most notable is the terms that
these costs take on in light of the underlying symbolic context established
by the mirror image institutions considered above. Simply put, the tort
system usurps the role of these institutions, and as a result, denies us the
power to make decisions we should be entitled to resolve on our own.
First, the ostensible fear people feel that dissuades them from
engaging activities they might otherwise have pursued is set in an important
contextual framework. Take, for example, one of the situations discussed in
the Newsweek article referenced above: the priest who, because of his
understanding of the contemporary American legal climate, is loath to
initiate any physical contact at all with his congregants, even an innocuous

_______________________________________________________
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hug.242 To be sure, the hypothetical is intended to appear troubling on its
face, for after all, we are left to think, there is no reason a priest should be
intimidated from engaging in such conduct. More broadly, though, his
desire to do so takes on the character of a right, or perhaps, several: it is his
right, as a priest, to make decisions as to how best to perform his job; and it
is our right, as a community, to decide when he should not. Accordingly, in
addition to losing the benefit of a priest acting to the fullest extent of his
capacities, we are also, the argument follows, being denied the right to
decide the social boundaries of individual action.
Second, the apparently crushing damages that have been imposed
on society by the litigation explosion are likewise set upon a foundation of
principle. This might be illustrated by Vice President Quayle’s assertion
that the “litigation explosion” was placing the nation at a “competitive
disadvantage” to foreign businesses.243 Certainly, the point speaks for itself
in suggesting an ill resulting from purportedly excessive court costs.
However, the additional dimension it might take on is that it is the
government, not trial lawyers (via the courts) who should be making
decisions that have so broad an impact on the competitiveness of industry.
This is a regulatory decision that should be left to government—that is, to be
committed to the realm of choice—but has not been because the court
system has transgressed its bounds. Moreover, in driving up the cost of
goods that individuals purchase, the tort system burdens the exercise of
individual choice—that is, it makes it harder for people to obtain the things
they want.
Most importantly, taking the continued implications of suffusion
into account, these consequences are brought upon society by lawyers and
plaintiffs. Proponents of tort reform draw no conceptual distinction between
lawyers and the legal system; it is their argument that, whatever limited
benefit to society might be secured by the courts, the lawyers have co-opted
it for their own ends. That which would happen if the legal system were
restored to its putatively narrower historical role is defined with reference to
individual choice: if courts only did their job, we’d work everything else out
by making choices. In essence, then, the lawyers are usurping society’s
right to make these choices. Moreover, because attorneys do not act for the
betterment of society, the decisions that are eventually imposed on a society
powerless to resist them are neither efficient nor fair.
b.

Patients First, Choice, and Disempowerment

Throughout the course of the debate concerning the Patients First
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Act, the most prominent theme running through the speeches given on the
Senate floor related to the burdens the legal system imposed on society.244
As discussed, an underlying assumption of much of the tort reform literature
is that the legal system is ultimately unnecessary for the regulation of
conduct in light of the norms that either are, or should be, prevailing in
society. In this instance, proponents of the legislation made a similar such
argument, contending that, except for compensation purposes, the courts
need not intercede in the health care arena because doctors are willing and
able to police themselves. In essence, the argument posits, because doctors
are both reasonable and compassionate professionals, they have no desire to
inflict harm on their patients; accordingly, where necessary, they will take
steps to address and abate potentially harmful risks. Sen. Ensign, the
principal sponsor of the bill, contended:
People talk about decreasing the amount of mistakes by
physicians, and we need to do that. It is very difficult and
very complex to do. One of the ways we can do that is to
enact legislation to encourage voluntary reporting. The
current system actually is a protectionist-type system that if
somebody voluntarily reports mistakes, they set themselves
up for lawsuits. So we have no way to follow where the
mistakes are being made and to point out trends so we can
correct those mistakes.245
Accordingly, he proceeded, it was necessary, after the tort reform bill was
passed, to develop measures that would facilitate such self-regulation.246 By
this token, the effect of the legal system’s involvement was to thwart
doctors’ desire to improve their conduct, not to mention divest them of the
choice as to how best to do so. In essence, an ineffectual result was imposed
upon them, without rationale, from above.
Self-regulation by doctors aside, the remainder of risk could safely
be committed to the realm of individual and professional choice. Sen.
Cornyn put this point most forcefully in stating, “I believe the proper role of
the Government is to protect the freedom of all people to act in their own
interests and in the interest of their health. . . . Patients and doctors, rather
than lawyers and bureaucrats, should be trusted to decide what treatment is
best for themselves and their patients.”247
Atop the foundational premise provided by the assertion that the tort
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system is unnecessary where doctors and patients are equipped to make their
own decisions, advocates of the legislation suggested two overarching levels
on which the courts were burdening or disempowering society. First, they
contended that doctors were disempowered. In the advancement of this
argument, the doctors were humanized—in essence, treated as members of
the society-at-large who happened to have been touched by the tort system.
Sen. Ensign established this theme in his opening speech, stating, “Rates are
forcing so many physicians and hospitals into a situation they did not want
to be in. They went into these practices because of the compassion they felt
for patients, and they are not being able to deliver the services because of
the out-of-control costs of medical liability insurance.” 248 Due to the
increases in insurance premiums, some doctors were being forced to “leave[]
their practices altogether because they simply can no longer afford to
practice because of exorbitant medical malpractice insurance rates.” 249
Others, the argument proceeded, were required to relocate to neighboring
states.250
Second, society itself was disempowered by the tort system. During
the debate, those speaking in favor of the bill advanced two primary
contentions regarding the harmful effects of the apparent unavailability of
medical care. The first was a matter of fairness. Sen. Enzi perhaps put the
point most directly in stating, “[I]t is pretty hard for an expectant mother in
Wyoming to pursue her happiness when she has to pursue her doctor for one
more well-baby check-up before he closes his practice and leaves for a State
where insurance premiums are lower.”251 As a matter of principle, by this
contention, it is not fair for people to be denied convenient access to care.252
More generally, this contention is rooted in the idea that people should, as a
matter of principal, have easy access to health care, and that the tort system
prevents such a state of affairs from coming about. 253 The second, and
related argument, is that a lack of availability of care can be dangerous. Sen.
Ensign, contended, for example, that “[t]he women are now pregnant and
their obstetricians no longer can deliver babies because they may be a high
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risk delivery and they can no longer afford to provide that type of a
service.” 254 Similarly, Sen. McConnell argued that emergency trauma
centers were closing due to the increases in insurance rates brought about by
the tort system.255
IV.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to explain the manner in which the
various arguments advanced in favor of tort reform interact with one another.
It has argued that the case for tort reform is not a collection of disparate
contentions linked by a common underlying policy aim, but rather, a set of
mutually reinforcing arguments that congeal with one another. Further, it
has contended that the case for tort reform functions not only on a logical
level, but on an emotional/psychological one as well; its proponents seek to
advance their case not only by arguments, but imagery as well.
In this vein, it has made three principal claims. First, the arguments
advanced in favor of tort reform are predicated upon the foundational
premise that the legal system exists primarily to bring resolution only to
individual disputes. As such, whatever broader consequences its judgments
bear for society more broadly are unintended, at least from a normative
standpoint, and exceptionally problematic. Second, the case for tort reform
largely operates by taking these externalized consequences and defining
them with reference to the problematic motivations and values of trial
lawyers and plaintiffs. In essence, it draws no distinction between the legal
system and the assertedly bad actors who avail themselves of its machinery.
Third, and finally, tort reformers argue that these consequences should be
seen, all told, to disempower society, by burdening or thwarting individual
choice usurping the role of democratic governance. As a subsidiary point,
the legal system also culturally disempowers us by encouraging a mindset of
victimization and undermining community cohesion.
For those who seek to rebut the case for tort reform, perhaps the
most significant message that could be taken from this article is that they
have their work cut out for them. Proponents of tort reform have
promulgated an incredibly expansive corpus of literature concerning the
apparent flaws and transgressions of the legal system. This body of
literature is, in one sense, diverse, insomuch as it has been advanced by a
variety of sources, some of them surprising (e.g., George McGovern and
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Griffin Bell) and others less so (e.g., the Heritage Foundation and Wall
Street Journal). In another sense, though, the accounts take on a remarkable
uniformity, sharing, with virtual unanimity, a belief in an extremely reticent
tort system and the value, above all else, of individual choice. In addition to
advancing a series of empirical claims, many of them dubious,256 proponents
of tort reform have deployed a portrayal of the legal system that has entered
the popular consciousness.
Obviously, none of this is to say that the case for tort reform has
been categorically accepted by society. But some of the claims that underlie
it have been afforded credence, including the mythology of a legal system
run amok. At present, worthy efforts are being made to refute the case for
tort reform. One that bears special mention is the Center for Justice and
Democracy, which counts as members of its board of advisors, among
others, Professor Galanter, filmmaker Michael Moore, and activist Erin
Brockovich.257
In light of the analysis advanced in this article, a brief assessment of
these efforts is warranted. Simply put, from a rhetorical standpoint,
proportionally speaking, too much effort has been devoted to dispelling the
factual claims that advanced as part and parcel of the case for tort reform
and, simultaneously, not enough has been directed to addressing the
symbolic contentions that underlie and bind it. This, again, is not to say that
no such effort has been undertaken at all. The Center for Justice and
Democracy website, for instance, includes a video in which a giant in a
corporate suit is felled by a judge with a gavel, after which a caption reading
“America’s trial lawyers. Our last line of defense in the fight for justice” is
emblazoned across the screen. 258 This response has the makings of an
effective rebuttal, insomuch as it contains an affirmative conception of the
purpose of the legal system and effectively deploys imagery to that end.
In light of this article’s analysis, at least two significant points
should be borne in mind in responding to the case for tort reform. First,
more than many commentators have previously appreciated, arguments for
tort reform operate upon the notion that the legal system is a passive
institution, lacking both an important underlying purpose and the
wherewithal to resist arguments made by trial lawyers. As to the latter,
throughout the course of the tort reform debate, the public has remained
woefully undereducated about the safeguards in place to reduce excessive
damages awards and the reliability of the jury system. And as to the former,
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much of the debate regarding the role of the legal system has taken place in
a conceptual vacuum, insomuch as little, if any, genuine discussion has
taken place as to what the tort system exists to do in the first instance.
Senators are able to argue that non-pecuniary damages are relatively
unimportant because people are not generally familiar with why they are
awarded. Similarly, the argument that the legal system should have no
effects outside the resolution of individual disputes, in addition to being
practically altogether infeasible, also trades on this lack of general
knowledge. In meeting arguments for tort reform, it is incumbent upon
defenders of the system to articulate a normative justification for why the
system has a broader role to play in establishing the boundaries of
appropriate conduct. Second, it should now be clear that the discourse
taking place is a political one. As such, while logical arguments are
important, they are perhaps of lesser value than effective use of symbols,
imagery, and rhetoric. Discussing individual, meritorious cases—and
making the paradigm—is absolutely essential.
But, in conclusion, the most important point to be made is this: the
public remains woefully undereducated about the purposes and operations of
the civil justice system. At least in part, this owes to the fact that legal
academics have very rarely, if ever, attempted to explain the workings of the
system to a general audience. While polemics directed categorically against
the tort system, such as those by Walter Olson and Philip K. Howard, are
widely available, accessible explanations of the tort system simply are not.
As such, while many of the factual and normative arguments advanced in
such screeds receive little credit in law journals, they remain unaddressed,
and therefore, un-refuted among their intended audience, the general public.
There is, in short, a wide information gap between public literature and
academic journals. It would be valuable, indeed, if scholars attempted to
bridge that gap.
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